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ABSTRACT
This  working paper  analyzes  the development of  the direct  democracy
institutions  in  Poland using the  critical  junctures  and path  dependence
methodology.  These  institutions  have  been  present  in  the  Polish
constitutional law scholarship since the beginning of the 20th century. Their
introduction into the law was nevertheless a difficult compromise between
the  political  actors.  Throughout  the  past  century,  direct  democracy
mechanisms were seldom used, partly due to the fact that the citizens
were not allowed to make a final decision as to their application. As the
study shows, the current legislation on direct democracy is still rooted in
the Communist  times and marked by the Legislature's  and Executive's
deep distrust in the people’s ability to make conscious decisions.
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1 Introduction
The  study  of  path  dependence  has  been  successfully  applied  in
research in the fields of economy, social science or political science. Despite
being an important trend in analyzing how the past can influence the current
processes,  this method is not yet a popular research tool  within the legal
scholarship.  This  study  aims  at  applying  the  critical  juncture  and  path
dependence  formulas  to  the  analysis  of  the  development  of  the  direct
democracy  institutions  in  Poland  and  their  entrenchment  in  laws.  As  this
method proved to  be  useful  in  estimating  the genesis  of  the  institutions,
when applied to the legal structure of direct democracy, it helps to point out
the events that are responsible for the current state of those institutions in
Poland and at the same time, it reaches further than merely stating that the
past affects the future.
When analyzing the development of the direct democracy institutions
in modern Poland,  it  is  necessary to point out three moments in the 20 th
century history that were crucial for shaping the referendums and popular
initiatives as we know them today. Those were the phases or moments in
time which initiated sequences of  events  that  resulted in  introducing and
shaping the legal structure of direct democracy. Those key points in Polish
20th century history set the direction in relation to these institutions, made it
more probable for the institution to follow a particular path of development
and at the end - affected the outcome. 
Using the construct of the path-dependent analysis, the description of
the development of direct democracy institutions is divided in this research
into  phases,  namely:  antecedent  (initial)  conditions,  critical  junctures,
production phases, reproduction phases, reactive sequences (which do not
always occur but when they do, they tend to replace the reproduction phase)
and the outcome. Taking into account how the concept of path dependence
developed over time, it  is crucial  to establish rigorous criteria for each of
those phases. 
The sequence  of  path  dependency is  opened by the  antecedent  or
initial conditions which are a "base line"1 of the critical junctures. Antecedent
conditions are  occurrences,  causally  linked with  critical  junctures  (but  not
necessarily  with  any  impact  on  the  further  stages  of  the  path),  in  which
critical junctures are rooted.2 They can be distinguished from other events by
establishing  their  causal  connection  with  respect  to  critical  junctures.
However, it is the critical juncture that needs to be identified first and only
afterwards its antecedent conditions can be distinguished, as the antecedent
conditions  on  their  own  cannot  be  characterized  as  being  predestined  to
create or result in critical junctures.
1 Ruth Berins Collier/David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures,
the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton 1991,
p. 30.
2 James  Mahoney,  Path-Dependent  Explanations  of  Regime  Change:  Central
America  in  Comparative  Perspective,  Studies  in  Comparative  International
Development, Vol. 36, no. 1 /2001, p. 113.
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Critical junctures are the moments in time that are triggered by initial
conditions.  They  can  be  characterized  as  moments  which  change  the
particular  trajectory  of  institutional  development  or  at  least  when  such
change of the trajectory is feasible. As it is stated in the literature on the
subject,  critical  junctures  "are  choice  points  when  a  particular  option  is
adopted from among two or more alternatives."3 They may be described as
open windows of opportunity which close after a certain choice is made. 
Critical junctures are often characterized as being contingent. Taking
into  account  the fact  that  these  moments  in  time are  rooted in  previous
events  and  always  set  in  a  particular  political  situation,  it  cannot  be
successfully argued that "contingency" in this situation means "randomness"
or "unforeseeability". Instead, "contingency", in relation to critical junctures,
should be understood as a state of existence of more than one option, where
the choice of a particular option is not predictable (as it does not represent
the only imminent, realistic variable) but at the same time it is not random
(as the possible choices are related to the political background). Also, the
final outcome (the legacy) of the particular choice cannot be foreseen at the
moment of the critical juncture, but is nevertheless causally linked to it. 
The choices made during the critical juncture may lock-in the path for
the development of the institutional pattern, as when the previously recalled
window of opportunity closes, the change in the path taken becomes difficult.
Therefore, all of the below-mentioned critical phases can also be verified by
the use of a counterfactual method, namely by asking if the particular event
had not taken place, would the shape of the direct democracy institutions be
different. It also needs to be stressed that this research focuses only on the
formation of direct democracy institutions and their inclusion in law. For this
reason, some historical events which were crucial for the development of the
Polish political system may appear insufficiently handled here. It is so only
because not all of the crucial political events had an effect on the shape of
the institutions of interest.
This  study  shows  that  the  next  stage  of  institutional  development,
namely  the  production  phase  (preceding  the  actual  reproduction  of  the
institutional pattern) should be paid more attention than it has been given
until  now by authors who use the path-dependent method. As the critical
juncture does not necessarily end with or result in the direct and immediate
formation of the institution, but instead only fixes the development path for
it,  the  institutional  pattern  needs  to  be  created  first,  in  order  to  be
reproduced.  The  phase  of  the  production  of  institutional  pattern  was
distinguished  in  the  works  of  Collier  and  Collier  and  Mahoney.4 Mahoney
referred to this phase in a more general manner by including it, together with
the reproduction phase in the structural persistence period, as presented in
his analysis of the path-dependent explanation.5 
As this study shows, it may happen that a critical junctures changes
the trajectory of the institutional development but not in a direct manner but
3 Ibidem, p. 113.
4 Ruth Berins Collier/David Collier, p. 30 and James Mahoney, Path-Dependent,
p. 113 and 122-124.
5 James Mahoney, Path-Dependent, p. 113.
7
C2D Working Paper Series 44 / 2013
rather indirectly, through a sequence of intermediate events, which form a
causal,  stable,  and  gradual  process.  Therefore,  the  description  of  the
production phase provided by Collier and Collier proves to be more adequate,
as they state that "it is useful to distinguish between the mechanisms of the
reproduction  and  the  production  of  the  legacy.  There  often  occurs  a
significant interval between the critical juncture and the period of continuity
that is explained by these mechanisms of reproduction."6 They further point
out that "to the extent that the critical juncture is a polarizing event that
produces intense political reactions and counterreactions, the crystallization
of the legacy does not necessarily occur immediately, but rather may consist
of  a  sequence  of  intervening  steps  that  respond  to  these  reactions  and
counterreactions."7 
At first sight, this description of a production phase may resemble the
doctrinal characteristics of the reactive sequence phase, where reactions and
counterreactions  shape  the  institutions  instead  of  reproducing  the
institutional pattern. This is, however, only an apparent impression, as the
difference between the production phase and reactive sequence lays in the
direction in which the events in the mentioned sequences are aimed. In the
case  of  the  reactive  sequence,  the  reactions  and  counterreactions  are
causally linked but are simulataneously also aimed against the institutional
pattern  (as  for  instance  in  Mahoney's  example  of  the  Democratizing
Episodes8). In contrast, in case of the production phase, the causally linked
events do not arise from the conflicting interests of the political actors but
"flow", as it  may be described, in the direction set or even forced by the
critical juncture.
The production  phase is  followed by  the  reproduction phase,  which
consists of the repetition of the scheme formed during the production phase.
This stage may be characterized by the feature of increasing returns (positive
feedback).9 It takes place when the institutional patter is established and the
change in it is not likely to occur. The reasons for such a state may be various
as different factors (political, sociological, to some extend legal) play a role in
the institutional development. As the research for this paper has shown, the
concept  of  the  power  of  political  actors  (recalled  i.a.  by  Pierson10 and
Mahoney11) seems to be a major factor in reproduction of the institutions of
direct democracy, as the institution persists as long as the change is not in
the interest (forced or voluntary) of the actors being in power. As Mahoney
states, "once the institution develops (…), it is reinforced through predictable
power dynamics:  the  institution initially  empowers  a  certain  group at  the
expense of other groups; the advantaged group uses its additional power to
expand the institution further; the expansion of the institution increases the
6 Ruth Berins Collier/David Collier, p. 37.
7 Ibidem, p.37.
8 James Mahoney, Path-Dependent, p. 113 and 125.
9 James Mahoney/Daniel Schensul, Historical Context and Path Dependence, in:
Robert  E.  Goodin,  Charles  Tilly  (ed.),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Contextual
Political Analysis, Oxford 2006, p. 465.
10 Paul  Pierson,  Politics  in  Time.  History,  Institutions,  and  Social  Analysis,
Princeton 2004, p. 36.
11 James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, Theory and Society,
Vol. 29, no. 4/2000, p. 521.
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power  of  the  advantaged  group;  and  the  advantaged  group  encourages
additional institutional expansion."12 Such a correlation between the actions
taken by the advantaged and disadvantaged political actors may be observed
when the Government or Parliament are not willing to respond positively to
people's will to participate in the decision-making process. Authorities do not
want to share their power and therefore the people have no chance to learn
how  to  participate  in  the  decision-making  process  which  subsequently
enhances the people's lack of interest in the political life of their country and
unwillingness to take civil responsibility. However, such an endurance of the
institutional pattern may lead to the next phase, namely reactive sequences,
when the previously disadvantaged group becomes strong enough to reach
for their proper place in the decision-making process.
In  the  case  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  the
reproduction phase was often suppressed by the reactive sequence phase,
due to the instability of the political system caused by the inner and outside
political tensions. As explained above, the reactive sequence phase can be
characterized  by  the  chains  of  reactions  and counterreactions,  where  the
actors'  resistance  to  prevailing  institutions  can  be  the  initial  force  that
launches a reactive sequence.13 As Mahoney explains, "reactive sequences
are often marked by properties of backlash and counterresponse as actors
challenge or support institutional patterns established during critical juncture
period."14
At  the  end  of  the  development  path  we  can  describe,  what  the
outcome or the legacy of the critical juncture is. In the cases in which the
reactive sequence appears, the resolution of the conflict created by reactions
and counterreactions is the outcome of interest of the whole process. In the
instances  when  the  institution  develops  solely  through  the  means  of
reproduction, the outcome is manifested as the final shape of the institutions,
reinforced  by  the  repetition  sequence.  Nevertheless,  describing  the  final
outcome at the current stage of the institutional development does not mean
that  the  development  of  the  institution  stops.  Rather,  it  is  only  our
perspective of the assessment of the institutions that is simply limited by
time.
In Poland, the historical changes in the newly formed State often did
not  allow the  path  dependent  process  to  fully  develop  and stabilize.  The
legacies of critical junctures were of a temporary character. However, even
the critical  phases that led to a relatively short-lived outcome shaped the
subsequent  circumstances  that  eventually  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the
direct democracy institutions as we know them today. Not all of these events
led to the popularization or broadening of the scope of the use of the above-
mentioned institutions. Actually, the first two of them had an adverse effect
and in the end stabilized the lack of the institutions and also shaped to some
extent  people's  mentality,  making  neither  the  nation  nor  the  Polish
authorities used to or eager to rely on this kind of power-sharing. It is only the
12 Ibidem, p. 521.
13 Ibidem, p. 115.
14 Ibidem, p. 115.
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last critical juncture that set the path of the historical development on a track
that allowed the legal structure of the direct democracy institutions to evolve
to a very modest, burdened with past experiences, level. 
2 Phase 1: 11 November 1918- 17 March 1921
This section deals with the first critical juncture observed in the 20 th
century and the development path it established for the direct democracy
institutions.  It  will  be  shown that  the  choices  made during  this  particular
critical juncture by the political actors responsible for structuring the political
system  of  post-war  Poland,  led  directly,  in  the  short  term,  to  the
transformation of the previously established parliamentary system and the
subsequent formation of the authoritarian rule, which did not allow for the
implementation of any direct democracy institutions. 
As part of this critical juncture, it becomes especially apparent how the
making of decision at a specific time matters. If the parliamentary system in
Poland was established at a time when there were no political tensions in
Europe, its transformation or development would probably not have been as
severe. Nevertheless, it was formed at a time when the newly-formed Poland
was still establishing its position on the post-war map of Europe. As a result,
the  parliamentary  system was doomed to  be insufficient  for  securing the
efficient functioning of the state. Even though during this critical juncture the
introduction of the direct democracy institutions into the legal system was
intensively considered, the subsequent locked-in development of the political
system made such an introduction impossible, entrenching the system that
did not provide for any citizens' participation in the decision-making process.
This outcome was however short-lived as soon afterwards the Second World
War broke out. 
2.1 Critical juncture and its antecedent conditions
2.1.1 Introduction
An  understandable  point  in  history,  to  be  recognized  as  a  critical
juncture,  is  the  moment  when  Poland  regained  independence,  which  is
considered to have taken place on 11 November 1918. Naturally, regaining
independence  was  not  a  sudden occurrence  that  took  place  only  on  that
particular day, but this symbolic date was chosen for number of reasons - on
this day Germany agreed to the armistice, but also Poles restored their rule
over Warsaw after a symbolic disarmament of a German garrison. On that
day, the Regency Government also appointed Józef Piłsudski as a Commander
of the Polish Forces and subsequently, on 14 November 1918, he was given
complete civil power as well. On 16 November 1918, Piłsudski notified all of
the countries taking part in the First World War and the neutral countries of
10
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the fact that the Polish State was recreated.15  The independence of Poland
was confirmed in the Versailles Declaration of 3 June 1918 (signed by Great
Britain, France and Italy)16 and finally in the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28
June 1919 by Germany and the Entente Powers. The Polish territorial situation
was however not yet fully stabilized.17 For instance, Polish borders were still
changing until 15 March 1923 when the final resolution of the Conference of
Ambassadors of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (which included
the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan) was signed.
2.1.2 Antecedent conditions
The fact that Poland would regain independence was to some extent
already foreseeable  at  the end of  the First  World  War.  The Triple  Entente
countries  started  to  express  clearly  their  understanding  for  the  Polish
independence movement.  Soon  after  the February  Revolution in  Russia  in
1917, after the Carat was overthrown, the Polish right to independence was
already recognized. This right was confirmed after the Bolshevik Revolution
(the  Great  October  Socialist  Revolution18)  in  November  1917  on  a  few
occasions,  mostly in the Declaration on the Rights of the Russian Nations
from 15 November 1917.19 The United States had also acknowledged that
right. The speech of Woodrow Wilson given on 8 January 1918 was symbolic
in this matter. He stated that an independent Polish State should be formed.
This newly-built country should spread over the territories inhabited by the
people of undeniably Polish origin, it should have an uninterrupted access to
the sea and it should benefit from political and economic autonomy, as well
as the territorial integrity. All of these features of the rebuilt state, according
to Wilson, should be secured by an international treaty.20 These events laid
the foundations for the critical juncture to begin. They opened a window of
new possibilities but had no influence on the choices of the actors deciding
on the future of Poland.
2.1.3 Critical juncture
After the First World War, it was crucial to establish the foundations of the
new State and its political system. The legal orders that were dictated and in
force on the Polish territory during over hundred years of partitions could no
longer be accepted. This was not only due to the fact that they differed from
15 Marian Kallas, Historia ustroju Polski, Warszawa 2005, p. 257.
16 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy Polski współczesnej. Geneza i system,
Kraków 2006 (reprint Wilno 1937), p. 19.
17 Marian Kallas, p. 252-256.
18 At the time in Russia the Julian calendar was in place, therefore according to
that calendar the revolution started in October, even though according to the
Gregorian calendar it was already November.
19 Marian Kallas, p. 252.
20 Ibidem, p. 252.
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one  another  but  also  because  regaining  independence  called  for  the
establishment of a new legal system. The crucial time when the future Polish
system was formed and established and when the decisions concerning the
inclusion of the direct democracy mechanisms in the new order were made
lasted  until  the  adoption  of  the  so-called  March  Constitution,  which  was
passed on 17 March 1921.  At  that  particular  moment  in time,  the actors
responsible for the newly-formed State faced a broad range of choices, not
only in relation to the political system itself, but also with regard to the direct
democracy institutions.
To  justify  the  choice  of  this  rather  a  lengthy  critical  juncture,  it  must  be
stressed that the choice of a new legal rule is not an overnight process. On
the contrary, it requires many smaller decisions and events. Right after the
First World War, the only certain thing was that Poland would be governed by
a democratic system. Throughout this whole period described as a critical
juncture, it was uncertain which variation of it would be eventually chosen.
Before the War, there was nearly no discussion about the possible shape of
the Polish political system, as there was no realistic possibility, that Poland
would regain independence.21 The first preparations and proposals had been
made during the war, from 1917 onwards, when it became clear that there
would be a place for Poland in post-war Europe. Those ideas and proposals
were however prepared when the future of Poland was not yet determined.
All of them were based on the doctrine of parliamentary monarchy22 which
meant  reaching  back  directly  to  the  Polish  pre-partitions  traditions.  This
direction was completely abandoned after the War. 
Right after the war, the work on the actual Constitution proposal was soon
postponed  due  to  various  matters  requiring  more  urgent  parliamentary
attention. After all, Poland was lacking even the most basic rules regulating
the State bodies on a central level. The legislative process that led to the
stabilization of the new legal rule in Poland started by Piłsudski issuing on 14
November 1918 a decree in which he appointed Ignacy Daszyński to form the
Government. Daszyński however failed in his mission, due to a strong right-
wing opposition, and eventually Jędrzej Moraczewski formed the Temporary
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Poland.23 On  22  November  1918,  Józef
Piłsudski enacted the decree on the highest executive power of the Republic
of  Poland,  where  he  appointed  himself  as  a  Provisional  Chief  of  State
(Naczelnik Państwa), until the first Parliament would begin its work. On 28
November, Piłsudski announced a decree on the electoral system (ordynacja
wyborcza)  and  on  the  same  day,  based  on  that  decree,  Piłsudski  issued
another one in which he set the date of the parliamentary elections on 26
January 1919. 24 Some authors claim that the establishment of the electoral
system and the setting of the date for the free elections were the actions that
created the nation as the "corpus electoral".25  The new Parliament, elected
on the basis of a new five-point electoral law, which also granted active and
21 Marcin  Rachwał,  Instytucje  demokracji  bezpośredniej  w  dyskusji  sejmowej
przed uchwaleniem Konstytucji Marcowej, Przegląd Sejmowy 6(113)/2012, p.
74.
22 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 30.
23 Marian Kallas, p. 256.
24 Ibidem and Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 24-25.
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passive voting rights to women, was summoned in February 1919. Piłsudski
resigned from his post, but since the new Parliament had not yet enacted any
laws  on  the  new  political  system,  Piłsudski  was  appointed  to  continue
performing the function of the Chef of State, as provided for by the Sejm (the
lower chamber of Polish Parliament) resolution of 20 February 1919.26 This
resolution is often referred to as a Small Constitution, as it guaranteed the
democratic rule and personal freedoms for the citizens.27 
All  of the above-mentioned laws were of a temporary character. Their role
was to stabilize the legal  situation in order to create a basis for the new
Constitution.  The  institutions  of  direct  democracy  were  not  mentioned  in
these  laws  at  all.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  at  that  time  the
institutions of direct democracy were not used. The territorial plebiscites were
launched, as they were provided for in the Treaty of Versailles (in Article 88
for the territory of Silesia and in Article 96 for the territory of Warmia and
Masuria). The first one took place on 11 July 1920 on the territory of Warmia
and Masuria. The second one took place in Silesia on 20 March 1921.28 Both
of  those  plebiscites  had  in  general  a  negative  result  from  the  Polish
perspective.   In  Warmia and Masuria people voted against joining Poland,
mostly because of the overwhelming German terror on that territory.29 The
second plebiscite's results were only partially more favorable towards Poland
as,  upon the people’s decision,  the south-east  part  of  Silesia  rejoined the
Polish territory.30 
Also, the Constitutional Act containing the Statute of the Silesian Voievodship,
enacted by the Polish Parliament on 15 July 1920, in its Article 14 provided for
the  possibility  to  introduce  a  referendum  in  the  autonomous  Silesian
Voievodship.  However,  the  Parliament  of  the  Silesian  Voievodship  never
passed an act creating a legal framework for the referendum.31
These few instances when the institutions of direct democracy were used,
turned out to be, from the time perspective, rather random than structural.
Not only had the citizens of Poland no experience in the participation in the
decision-making process (due to the years of foreign oppression and also lack
of popular voting rights) but also the majority of the political representatives
did not consider the direct democracy institutions to be promising in respect
of the efficient decision-making process, which would soon be confirmed by
the results of the upcoming parliamentary debate.
Once  all  of  the  temporary  laws regulating  the  most  urgent  matters  were
enacted, the Polish Parliament, on 8 July 1920, engaged in the work on the
25 Paweł Sarnecki, Zasady ustrojowe odradzającej się Rzeczypospolitej, Przegląd
Sejmowy, Vol. 5 (28)/1998, p. 33.
26 Marian Kallas, p. 259 and Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 24 - 25.
27 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 10 and 26.
28 Andrzej Kulig, Bogumił Nalezinski, Referendum w systemie ustrojowym Polski,
Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 5 (17)/1996, p. 26.
29 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 21.
30 Ibidem, p. 21-22.
31 Dz.U. 1920 Nr 73, poz. 497 oraz Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p.86. 
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Constitution.32 The  creators  of  the  March  Constitution  did  not  make  any
significant  use  of  the  Polish  constitutional  traditions,  despite  the  ideas
presented in the first proposals written in 1917, which were based on the
doctrine of parliamentary monarchy. They intended to create a legal system
that would resemble and match the Constitutions of the Western European
countries.  However,  Poland  and its  society  at  that  time were  lacking  the
coherent  basis  for  such  a  complex  legal  order.33 Although  the  Polish
Constitution of 3 May 1791 was the second Constitution adopted in the World
and the first one in Europe, it has never been enforced due to the partition of
Poland. The 18th century ideas of  democracy, popular sovereignty, the rule of
law and freedom of  individual  inspired  of  course  the creation  of  the new
system (the 3 May Constitution was actually even mentioned in the preamble
to  the  March  Constitution  of  192134).  They  fully  responded  to  the  Polish
Nation's needs at that particular time. However, the full reception of the 18th
century legal framework was not possible and the creators of the new order
thus tried to adapt foreign democracy models to the Polish conditions. While
the new Polish system was inspired by other European forms of Government,
it cannot be assumed that it was blankly copied. One must bear in mind that
Poland had existed since the 10th century and therefore constituted a political
and cultural unity. In fact, the over hundred years of partition of Poland did
not extinguish its own identity.35 Nevertheless, those general rules had to be
filled with more precise content and for this purpose the authors of the March
Constitution were inspired by the system of the Third French Republic.36 
The  discussions  and  proposals  preceding  the  adoption  of  the  March
Constitution  were  very  fruitful,  i.a.  in  relation  to  the  direct  democracy
mechanisms. The available protocols of the  Sejm debates allow us to state
that many of the political parties strongly supported the idea of including the
direct democracy institutions in the new legal order. The proposals for the
Constitution often included complex provisions not only on referendums but
also on popular veto and on popular initiative.37 
Among  the  various  Constitution  proposals,  four  are  especially  worth
mentioning because of their attempt to introduce the institutions of direct
democracy.  The first  one was  prepared  by Mieczysław Niedziałkowski  and
submitted on behalf of the Polish Socialist Party. It was based on the idea of
the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  The  proposed  political  system  was  a
parliamentary  republic  with  a  broad  inclusion  of  the  direct  democracy
institutions. It suggested the introduction of referendum, popular veto (a post
legem facultative  referendum called against  an  act  of  law passed by  the
32 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 32.
33 Wacław  Komarnicki,  O  ustroju  państwa  i  konstytucji,  ed.  Stanisław  Kilian,
Warszawa 2000, p. 51-52.
34 Michał Pietrzak, Konstytucja z 17 marca 1921 r. z perspektywy 80 lat, Przegląd
Sejmowy 2(43)/2001, s. 9.
35 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 11.
36 Michał  Pietrzak,  p.  13,  Paweł  Sarnecki,  Konstytucja  Marcowa  a  rozwój
konstytucjonalizmu polskiego, Przegląd Sejmowy 2(43)/2001, s. 38, Mirosław
Granat,  Konstytucja  RP  na  tle  rozwoju  i  osiągnięć  konstytucjonalizmu
polskiego,  Przegląd  Sejmowy  4(81)/2007,  s.  12  and  Wacław  Komarnicki,  O
ustroju państwa, p. 67.
37 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, s. 75-76.
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Parliament),  popular  initiative  (for  which  validity  not  less  than  100  000
signatures would have to be collected) and even a popular motion for the
dissolution of the  Sejm, requiring 500 000 signatures, which would be filed
with the President.38 The Socialists wanted the whole population to participate
and  to  contribute  to  managing  State  affairs.  They  were  convinced  that
introducing direct democracy could help educating and integrating the Nation
and, most importantly, creating the notion of responsibility for the future of
Poland.39 It would also create an obstacle to a possible abuse of power by the
Parliament.40 The  proposal  for  introducing  the  institutions  of  direct
democracy, especially the popular initiative, was inspired by their existence
and broad use in the Swiss Confederation. 
The  Constitution  draft  prepared  by  Włodzimierz  Wakar  and  submitted  on
behalf of the left-wing political party PSL "Wyzwolenie" (Polish People's Party
"Wyzwolenie")  also  included  the  direct  democracy  mechanisms.  The
referendum was foreseen on the local, community level. It would have to take
place  to  confirm  all  of  the  major  decisions  taken  by  the  community
Parliaments.41 On the national level, according to the proposal, each citizen
would be entitled to submit a popular initiative, to address the Sejm with the
remarks  or  comments  about  the  draft  laws  that  were  considered  by  the
Parliament  and  also  to  address  the  Government,  through  the  Sejm,  with
requests for explanations concerning the Government policy.42 Further, if 500
000 signatures were collected, an act of law enacted by the Parliament would
have to be either again voted upon by the  Sejm or submitted to a national
referendum.  A  nation-wide  referendum  would  also  be  obligatory  in  the
matters of particular importance.43 Additionally, the first draft included the
empowerment  of  1 000  000  citizens  to  request  the  dissolution  of  the
Parliament or  the removal  of  the Head of  the State  from his  post.  These
provisions  were  however  removed from the  Party’s  final  draft,  which  was
submitted in the proceedings of the Parliament.44
Direct democracy institutions were also provided for in the Constitution draft
formulated by the Deputy Józef Buzek. This proposal was based on the US
political system and provided for the institutions of referendum and popular
initiative which could be applied only in relation to the Constitutions enacted
at the community level and the national level. It was particularly interesting
that  the  use  of  the  direct  democracy  institutions  was  limited  to  the
communities where at least 90% of all population was literate, as Józef Buzek
38 Marcin  Rachwał,  Demokracja  bezpośrednia  w  procesie  kształtowania  sie
społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce, Warszawa 2010, p. 103-104 and Anna
Rytel-Warzocha,  Referendum ogólnokrajowe w państwach Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej, Warszawa 2011, p. 95.
39 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 75. 
40 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 104.
41 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 81.
42 Ibidem and Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 105.
43 Ibidem, p. 105.
44 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 82
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was convinced that participation in the direct democracy process required at
least some political knowledge and education.45 
The last Constitution draft which included the institutions of direct democracy
was prepared by the Deputy Władysław Wróblewski. Although this proposal
was based on the system of the Third French Republic (which did not foresee
the  direct  democracy  mechanisms),  it  also  provided  for  the  legislative
popular initiative which could be submitted by 300 000 citizens, and for the
referendum  which  would  be  used  to  decide  on  a  passing  of  a  law  or  a
Constitution in exceptional situations, when the two chambers of Parliament
would not be able to reach consensus. In case of the amendments to the
Constitution, a referendum could be proposed by 300 000 people, but in the
case of an act of law, only one of the disagreeing chambers of Parliament had
a right to request the referendum.46 
None of these drafts were accepted by the Constitutional Commission, which
decided to prepare its own proposal. That draft, however, did not include any
traces of direct democracy institutions.47 The Deputies from the right-wing
parties  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  introduction  of  direct  democracy
mechanisms into the Commission's draft, stating that Poland would become
an arena of constant voting, which would not allow any legislative decisions
to be made. The example of Switzerland was recalled, where, according to
the Deputies, people made random, unnecessary decisions, but most of all
were weary of this kind of democracy (which was reflected by low voter’s
participation).48  
During the legislative procedure in the Sejm, which began on 8 July 1920, the
supporters  of  direct  democracy created a unified opposition against  other
Constitution drafts that did not mention these institutions in any form. As the
new Constitution would provide that the people of Poland were the sovereign,
they stressed that this declaration should be followed up with concrete legal
measures which would allow citizens to effectively participate in the decision-
making process. The people's participation in the power-sharing should be
real,  expressed,  among  others,  in  the  form  of  popular  initiative.  The
opponents,  however,  responded  that  the  popular  initiative  was  not  a
democratic, but demagogic and populist tool. 49 These views were actually
shared by the constitutional law scholars. For instance, Adhemar Esmein, a
French Professor  of  constitutional  law, published and acclaimed in  Poland,
was convinced that people do not have either the knowledge nor the time to
study legislative drafts to later make a conscious decision on their enactment
in the referendum.50 They would either accept the new legislation without
understanding  it  or  reject  it  because  of  a  small  detail  or  due  to  a
misunderstanding. He also criticized the advisory referendums, claiming that
45 Marcin  Rachwał,  Demokracja  bezpośrednia,  p.  104  -  105  and  Anna  Rytel-
Warzocha, Referendum ogólnokrajowe, p. 94.
46 Marcin Rachwał,  Instytucje,  p.  80-81 and Anna Rytel-Warzocha,  Referendum
ogólnokrajowe, p. 94-95.
47 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 106.
48 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 83.
49 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 107-108.
50 Adhemar  Esmein,  Prawo  Konstytucyjne,  Warszawa  2013  (reprint  Warszawa
1921), p. 314-316.
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they release the legislative bodies from the responsibility for the acts of law,
which created bad practice.51 Those opinions were also shared by Wacław
Komarnicki  and  by  the  Polish  Professor  Zygmunt  Cybichowski,  who,  by
recalling  the  Swiss  experience,  claimed that  people  could  reject  the  best
reforms and that they often took position, through popular votes, on issues
which they did not understand.52
Eventually, during the votes on individual provisions, all of those providing for
the  institutions  of  direct  democracy  were  rejected  by  the  majority  of
Deputies.53 The  March  Constitution  therefore  established  a  parliamentary
democratic system with no direct democracy institutions. This result of the
parliamentary process can be characterized by a certain level of contingency,
as the various drafts proposing the introduction of the institutions of direct
democracy were seriously considered in the Parliament. Up to the very end of
the legislative proceedings, it was not certain which option (the one providing
for  the  institutions  of  direct  democracy  or  the  one  omitting  them)  would
prevail. In the end, the establishment of an insufficient, for that moment in
time, political system, soon extorted the transformation of the system and in
fact led directly to the formation of an authoritarian rule in Poland.
2.2 Path-dependent process
2.2.1 Production phase
The  status  quo characterized  by  the  lack  of  the  institutions  of  direct
democracy was soon entrenched by the events that followed the enactment
of the March Constitution, which made it difficult to realistically imagine a
new attempt to introduce direct democracy. The new parliamentary system
established by the March Constitution of 1921 did not last long. Soon, the
political  processes  weakening  the  parliamentary  rule,  enhanced  by  the
deficiencies of the parliamentary system, started to prevail and eventually
resulted in the military Coup on the 12-15 May 1926, led by Józef Piłsudski
(the so-called "the May Coup"). It needs to be stressed that this military coup
was supported by the majority of the Polish citizens.54
The  slow  strengthening  of  the  presidential  power  had  begun  however  a
couple years before. The legal construction of the  Sejm provided for in the
51 Ibidem, p. 314-316.
52 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 84, citing Zygmunt Cybichowski, Polskie prawo
państwowe  na  tle  uwag  z  dziedziny  o  państwie  i  porównawczego  prawa
panstwowego,  vol.  II,  Warszawa  1927,  p.  61  and  Anna  Rytel-Warzocha,
Referendum  ogólnokrajowe,  p.  96,  citing  Mariusz  Jablonski,  Referendum
ogólnokrajowe w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym, Wrocław 2001, p. 22.
53 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 85.
54 Marian Kallas, p. 259.
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Constitution of 1921was criticized nearly from the outset. The lower chamber
of  the  Polish  Parliament  had  very  strong  competences,  which  led  to  the
Sejm's "absolutism" (mostly due to the weak competences of the President
and the Government, the lack of the possibility to dissolve the Parliament as
well as the lack of the Constitutional Tribunal entitled to review the laws). This
created a practical abdication of the Executive from performing even those
weak competences which it was empowered to perform. Such a situation was
particularly dangerous, when we bear in mind the fact,  that the described
system was  introduced  in  Poland  at  a  time  when  there  was  no  qualified
administration staff and when the Polish Deputies were not experienced in
ruling the country.55 The Prime Minister Władyslaw Grabski proposed that the
Sejm should give the President special authorization (pełnomocnictwo) which
would allow him to enact decrees with the binding force of law. The President
was equipped with such an authorization from 1924 onwards, but eventually
could not use it to carry out substantial economic or political reforms.56 
In 1926, the need for a significant state system reform became obvious. Not
only  the Polish  economy needed reforms,  but  also a strengthening of  the
State  through  a  constitutional  reform  was  necessary  because  of  the
Government crisis and the international political tensions which were again a
threat to the independence of Poland. Some authors even claimed that the
reform  may  save  the  Polish  Nation  from  shrinking  and  eventually
disappearing.57 In such circumstances, Józef Piłsudski, who had never been a
supporter  of  the form of  the system created in  the March Constitution of
1921,  reached for  power.  Such  a  decision  was  not  only  the  result  of  the
situation in Poland, but mostly also of the events in other European countries,
where from 1922 onwards authoritarian regimes had started to prevail  (in
Italy in 1922, in Spain in 1925, in Lithuania and Portugal in 1926, in Germany
in 193358).
Subsequently,  the  new Government,  with  Prof.  Kazimierz  Bartel  as  a  new
Prime Minister, proposed on 17 June 1926 a draft law significantly amending
the March Constitution. The Government intended to change the relation and
distribution  of  power  between  the  legislature  and  the  executive.59 The
authoritarian  rule  was  confirmed  in  the  so-called  August  Constitution
Amendment enacted on 2 August 1926. The Executive was strengthened by
the President being given the right of dissolution of the Parliament and the
right of issuing decrees which had the legal force of parliamentary acts of law.
He could exercise the latter entitlement between the Parliament's terms of
office. The President was also given a much broader right of issuing decrees
based on an authorization provided for by an act of law.60 
The  on-growing  conflict  between  the  Legislature  and  the  Executive  still
required a profound revision of the March Constitution. The deliberations on a
55 Wacław  Komarnicki,  O  ustroju  państwa,  p.  69,  Wacław  Komarnicki,  Ustrój
państwowy, p. 61-63 and Michał Pierzak, p. 12.
56 Wacław  Komarnicki,  O  ustroju  państwa,  p.  43-44,  59  and  68  and  Wacław
Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 82-84.
57 Wacław Komarnicki, O ustroju państwa, p. 45.
58 Wacław Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy, p. 7-8.
59 Ibidem. p. 67-68.
60 Ibidem, p. 74-75.
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new Constitution began on 31 October 1928 when a parliamentary club - the
Non-partisan  Bloc for  Cooperation with  the Government (Bezpartyjny Blok
Współpracy z Rządem) - filed a resolution, requesting that the Sejm begin the
procedure on the revision of the March Constitution.61 Within these debates
the  left-wing  parties  tried  again  to  introduce  the  institution  of  popular
initiative, but at that time there was even less consensus for it than during
the  preparation  of  the  March  Constitution.  In  1929,  the  Socialists,  PSL
"Wyzwolenie"  and  the  Peasant  Party  (Stronnictwo  Chłopskie)  submitted
together an amendment to the March Constitution which provided for the
institution of popular initiative (requiring 100 000 signatures for its successful
submission). 62 The  educational  role  of  the  popular  initiative  was  again
stressed,  but  this  time  Mieczysław Niedziałkowski  resigned from trying  to
introduce a referendum, alongside an initiative. The mentioned parties, when
discussing  the  draft  amending  the  Constitution,  considered  including  the
referendum as well, but after all decided against it.63 Niedziałkowski changed
his opinion on the institutions of direct democracy because he had noticed
the disadvantages of the people's direct participation in the decision-making
process. He started claiming that the referendum, especially the obligatory
one, was an obstacle to change and reform, as people tended to vote in favor
of  maintaining  a  status  quo rather  than  for  proposed  amendments.
Additionally,  if  the  technical  difficulties  in  launching  a  referendum  on  a
(bigger  than  Swiss)  Polish  territory  were  taken  into  account,  the  general
evaluation of that institution must have been negative.64 His change of mind
can also be explained by the experience of the territorial plebiscites, which in
general were regarded as a failure.65 
This only shows that Poland was already on a track that made the inclusion of
the citizens in the decision-making process impossible. At this point, after the
inevitable  transformation  of  the  "absolute"  parliamentary  system  into  an
authoritarian  one,  the  institutional  pattern  that  was  established,  did  not
support  the  idea of  any  kind  of  the direct  democracy  institutions.  In  this
instance, it may be observed how the production of the pattern evolved. After
the starting point  (the enactment of  the March Constitution of  1921),  the
political  system  was  established  in  a  manner  that  could  not  sufficiently
respond to the unstable political  situation in Europe and hence had to be
transformed into a stronger and more adequate rule for that time. This did
not happen through a series of reactions and counterreactions which would
consist of the political actors acting against the regime (as will be observed in
case of the critical juncture of 1943), but instead the political system was
adjusted to the needs of the country in a non-revolutionary manner.
61 Paweł Sarnecki, Konstytucja Marcowa, p. 24.
62 Marcin Rachwał, Instytucje, p. 86. 
63 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Referendum ogólnokrajowe, p. 96.
64 Marcin  Rachwał,  Instytucje,  p.  86  and  Anna  Rytel-Warzocha,  Referendum
ogólnokrajowe, p. 96.
65 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Referendum ogólnokrajowe, p. 96.
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2.2.2 Reproduction phase
The  April  Constitution  of  1935  was  a  final  confirmation  of  the  new
authoritarian system. It made it impossible to even consider the introduction
of direct democracy institutions. The decisions made during the first years of
the  existence  of  the  Second  Republic  of  Poland  (mostly  concerning  the
structure of the Parliament that had "absolute" power, and the competences
of the Executive which were very limited), together with the political tensions
in Europe at the time, created the need for a strong leadership. The political
system  created  by  the  March  Constitution  was  not  well  adapted  to  this
situation due to the lack of maturity of the Polish Deputies and to the political
situation in Europe.
The phase that came after the enactment of the April Constitution should be
considered as a reproductive one. At that time, the reformed system, without
the direct democracy mechanisms, could better suit the needs of the country
and potentially secure its safety and existence. Time proved, however, that
this phase was extremely short lived. The reproduction of the institutional
pattern  which  did  not  provide  for  the  direct  democracy  mechanisms  was
quickly interrupted. Soon, the outbreak of the Second World War forced new,
unwelcomed changes into the Polish system.
2.3 Outcome 
The importance of this crucial phase for the shaping of the direct democratic
institutions in 20th century Poland may not be obvious at first instance. After
all,  this  period  did  not  lead  to  the  introduction  of  the  direct  democracy
mechanisms and, what is more, the political system introduced turned out to
be an authoritarian one. However, it is crucial to notice how popular these
ideas were at first, after the First World War, among the left-wing parties. This
should not be without significance when we try to establish the origins of
these  institutions  in  today's  Poland.  Besides,  the  introduction  of  the
institutions of direct democracy was carefully analyzed on the parliamentary
forum during  the  critical  juncture  phase.  Unfortunately,  the  French  model
used and the  recalled  Swiss  experience  (which  was  in  the  view of  Polish
politicians  mostly  negative)  during  the  deliberations  on  the  March
Constitution,  set  a  pattern  that  excluded  the  possibility  of  using  direct
democracy mechanisms in Poland.66 
In  this  particular  case,  it  is  especially  useful  to  rely  on  a  counterfactual
argument. It is fair to state that if the choices made in 1921 were different,
even if  they were only temporary due to the subsequent historical events
(such as the establishment of the authoritarian rule in Poland in 1926 and the
Second  World  War  with  all  its  consequences),  the  direct  democratic
institutions could have already been rooted in the perception of the whole
Nation,  as  was  the  March  Constitution  of  1921.  If  direct  democracy
mechanisms were introduced at that time in some form, even a limited one,
66 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Referendum ogólnokrajowe, p. 96.
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then the later enactment of a referendum law in 1987 would not appear to be
such a significant legislative achievement (taking into account how difficult it
was  to  reach  the quorum necessary  for  the  referendum  result  to  be
binding).67 Such a hypothesis appears to be justified, as the provisions of the
Constitution  of  1921  had  been  recalled  during  the  debates  on  the
Constitution  of  1997.68 Therefore,  the  results  of  the  choices  made  nearly
hundred years ago still have consequences today. 
3 Phase 2: 28 November – 1 December 1943
This section covers the second critical  juncture and the subsequent
phases of the institutional legal development. The definite inclusion of Poland
under  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence  in  1943,  did  not  only  hinder  the
development of the direct democracy mechanisms (which already was the
case  with  regard  to  the  development  path  set  by  the  previous  critical
juncture),  but  it  also  deepened the division between the citizens and the
authorities. The USSR introduced a totalitarian regime, in which the so-called
"democratic" institutions were only a caricature of democracy. The imposed
system was not created for the people, but rather against them.
This system de facto suppressed the freedoms of citizens and it did not
offer  economic  wellbeing  and  stability.  Therefore,  soon  after  it  was
established,  the  citizens  started  to  express  their  deep  discontent  and
resistance. During this period, the authorities started to gradually lose their
power through a series of events (which can be described as reactions and
counterreactions aimed against the established institutional path). To some
extent,  they  became  more  lenient  and  willing  to  comply  with  people's
requests.  Eventually,  the conflict  between the citizens and the authorities
created the next critical juncture that placed the institutional patter back on
the "democratic" trajectory.
3.1 Critical junctures and its antecedent conditions
3.1.1 Introduction
The second crucial  moment in the history of direct democracy institutions
came in 1943, when it was decided that after the end of the Second World
War, Poland would find itself within the Soviet sphere of influence. This was
the moment when the choices of the European leaders, made against the will
of  the  Polish  Government  in  London  and  the  Polish  Underground  State
(Polskie Państwo Podziemne, the resistance organizations acting in Poland, in
cooperation  with  the  Polish  authorities  based  in  London)  in  Poland,
determined the course of the years to come and dramatically reshaped the
Polish system, which did not even have a chance to fully stabilize after the
67 The Law on popular consultations and referendum of 1987 is discussed on p.
28-33.
68 Michał Pierzak, p. 18.
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enactment of the April  Constitution. At this time, the previous institutional
pattern (even though disturbed temporally by the Second World War) was
unambiguously broken.
3.1.2 Antecedent conditions
After the outbreak of the Second World War, when Poland was attacked from
both sides by Germany and the USSR, the development of a state system of a
recently  rebuilt  country  was  interrupted.  Both  occupants  entered  into  an
agreement, on 28 September 1939, dividing Poland between themselves and
introducing,  by  illegal  means,  their  own  administration  on  the  occupied
territories.69 The official  Polish authorities moved to London and the Polish
Underground State  took all  measures to  save Polish  independence.  Those
initial  conditions  allowed  for  the  new  critical  juncture  to  form,  this  time
undoubtedly with detriment to Poland.
3.1.3 Critical juncture
Although Germany lost in the Second World War, Poland's situation was still
extremely difficult.  The Soviet Union severed the diplomatic relations with
Poland on 25 April  1943 and did  not  want  the independent  Poland to be
restored after the War. The other Allies agreed to the USSR terms during the
Conference in Teheran, which took place from 28 November until 1 December
1943.70 The US President Franklin Roosevelt  and the British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill accepted the plan that the Polish territory would be kept
under the Soviet rule. 
This agreement, confirmed later during the Conferences in Yalta (February
1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945), settled Poland's fate as it was clear
that  Poland,  deprived  of  its  allies,  would  not  be  able  to  fight  for  its
independence.  The  leaders  of  the  Polish  Underground  State  still  tried  to
negotiate with the Soviets their participation in the new Government but they
were  arrested  and  tried  in  Moscow.  On  28  June  1945,  a  Communist
Government  was  established  with  Edward  Osóbka-Morawski  as  a  Prime
Minister.  The  international  community  recognized  this  Government  as  an
official  Polish  executive  and  withdrew  its  recognition  for  the  Government
established for the time of the War in London.71 
The choices made during the Teheran Conference placed Poland within the
Soviet  sphere of  influence which had a bearing on the shape of  the new
system that  was to be formed on the Polish  territory.  This  point  in  Polish
history  should  be  considered  as  a  critical  juncture  for  it  changed  the
trajectory of Poland's evolution as a State. The choices of the actors, at that
time more the leaders of the USA, the UK and the USSR, than Polish leaders,
69 Marian Kallas, p. 262-263.
70 Marian Kallas, p. 266.
71 Ibidem, p. 266-267.
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determined the change and formation of the political system in Poland. The
choices  made  during  the  Teheran  Conference  can  be  characterized  as
contingent. They were of course rooted in the circumstances of the time and
could be described as a compromise reached by the most powerful European
leaders,  but  they  were  definitely  neither  obvious  nor  evident.  The  Polish
leaders especially did not expect such a result. Naturally, the USSR did not
conceal even earlier its intention to gain control over Poland. However, the
Polish State was still counting on the Western Allies help.
3.2 Path-dependent process
3.2.1 Production phase
The Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza), affiliated with the USSR,
began as early as in March 1943 the first preparations for establishing a new
rule in Poland.72 In  November 1943, the Party rejected the Constitution of
1935,  claiming  that  it  was  of  a  fascist  character,  and by this  action  also
clearly  stated  that  the  Polish  Government  in  London  should  not  be
recognized.73 The  Polish  Committee  of  National  Liberation  (Polski  Komitet
Wyzwolenia Narodowego, the first Polish temporary Government established
and controlled under Joseph Stalin's  supervision) announced that  the only
Polish  Constitution  that  could  be  recognized  until  a  new  Parliament  was
elected was the March Constitution of 1921.74 
After the Teheran Conference,  the Soviet claims to include Poland in their
influence sphere were accepted by the US and the UK and therefore  the
Communists  began  imposing  their  rule  in  Poland.75 The  parliamentary
elections only took place on 19 January 1947 (at the Yalta Conference the
Communist Government of Poland was obliged to launch free parliamentary
elections).  The  only  parties  allowed  to  passively  participate  were  those
recognized by the Communist regime. The results were forged because the
Government feared being defeated.76  
However,  before  the  new  Parliament  was  elected,  the  Communist
Government, seeking support (even if it was to be only fictional), wanted the
people to decide on the shape of the future regime. For this purpose, the
institution of  direct  democracy,  namely the referendum, was  used by the
State in this one instance, on 30 June 1946.  It was proposed by the Polish
Socialist Party in cooperation with the Polish Workers' Party77 and launched in
72 Paweł Borecki, Geneza Konstytucji PRL z 22 lipca 1952 r., Przegląd Sejmowy,
Vol. 5 (82)/2007, p. 75.
73 Ibidem, p. 76.
74 Ibidem, p.76.
75 Marian Kallas, p. 266.
76 Ibidem, p. 273.
77 The two parties joined together in 1948 and created the Polish United Workers'
Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR).
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a fashion typical for the Communist regime, namely to gain the legitimization
from  the  citizens  and  their  support  for  the  left-wing  parties.  The  other
practical reason behind this referendum was that the Polish Workers' Party
wanted  to  postpone  the  parliamentary  elections  and  test  peoples'  voting
preferences.78 
The  referendum  was  based  on  the  laws  enacted  only  for  this  particular
purpose.79 The State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN, a body
acting as the parliament, formed at the end of the Second World War and
controlled by the Soviet Union) enacted two laws regulating this particular
referendum. The first one, passed on 27 April 1946, on popular vote,80 stated
in its preamble that before the parliamentary elections, a referendum was to
be  launched,  to  let  the  people  decide  on  the  rules  governing  the  future
Constitution  and  on  the  socio-economic  and  political  transformations
resulting from defeating the Nazi invader. It set the date of the referendum on
30 June 1946 and formulated three referendum questions. The second law, on
the  popular  vote  procedure,  was  enacted  on  28  April  1946.81 This  law
provided  for  a  detailed  regulation  of  the  voting  rights,  constituencies,
referendum commissions, referendum campaign and voting rules. To increase
the  chances  for  a  successful  referendum, Article  32(3)  of  the  law on  the
popular vote procedure provided that voting cards that were not filled out by
the voters (but placed in the ballot  box) were to be considered valid and
containing  positive  answers  to  all  three  questions.  There  were  no
requirements for the quorum. Besides these two laws enacted for the purpose
of this particular referendum, there was no law at the time that provided in
general for the institutions of direct democracy.
As mentioned earlier, the referendum was of a pre-constitutional character.
The people were supposed to decide on the shape of the constitution that
was to be created. The voters were asked three questions: (1) if they wanted
the liquidation of the Senat (the upper house of Parliament); (2) if they opted
for the strengthening of the economic system introduced by the agricultural
reform  in  the  future  Constitution  and  the  nationalization  of  the  main
economic  branches,  with  the preservation of  the legally  protected private
initiative, (3) and if they wanted to keep the western borders of Poland on the
natural  border  of  the  Baltic  Sea  and  Odra  and  Nysa  Lużycka82 rivers.
According to the official results, 85,3% of the citizens entitled to take part in
the voting participated. The results of the vote were positive for all of the
questions: 68% of the voters said "yes" to the first question; 77,1%  to the
second;  and  91,4%  to  the  third.83 Officially  the  left-wing  parties  gained
support. The results were, however, fabricated which later was even admitted
78 Andrzej  Paczkowski,  Referendum  z  30  czerwca  1946  r.  Próba  wstępnego
bilansu, in: Danuta Waniek, Michal T. Staszewski (ed.), Referendum w Polsce
współczesnej, Warszawa 1995, p. 70 and 76.
79 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 110, Marian Kallas, p. 270 and
Henry  E.  Brady/Cynthia  S.  Kaplan,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet
Union, in: David Butler/Austin Ranney (ed.), Referendums around the World,
Basingstoke 1994, p. 182.
80 Dz.U.1946.15.104.
81 Dz.U.1946.15.105.
82 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 110.
83 Marian Kallas, p. 271.
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by some of  the communist  leaders.84 According to recent  scholarship,  the
public response was positive only with regard to the third question.85 Some
commentators claim that the results were fabricated with regard to all of the
questions.86 
Therefore,  this  outcome  must  have  had  a  significant  meaning  for  the
Communist party as it showed that the people could not be trusted to vote
according to the regime's will. Not only did it test the voters' preferences, but
also  it  taught  the  authorities  what  they  should  be  prepared  for  when
launching a public vote. The Communists learned from this experience and
soon afterwards summarized the reasons for the real negative outcome of the
referendum. During one of the Communist party meetings, right before the
parliamentary elections, it was stressed that during the referendum campaign
the  agents'  network  in  the  country  was  not  sufficiently  focused  on  the
referendum,  not  all  members  of  the  voting  committees  were  correctly
verified,  the  preventive  arrests  were  not  correctly  performed  and  the
Volunteer Reserve Militia (Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji  Obywatelskiej,  ORMO,
paramilitary  organization created in  1946 under control  of  the Ministry  of
Public  Security)  was  not  involved.87 Facing  such  a  declaration,  the
Communists' intentions with regard to launching the referendum appear to be
obvious.
Although the Communists already used the institution of a referendum and
effortlessly managed to fabricate the results and to keep that fact officially
secret  until  1989,88 none of  the  Constitution drafts  prepared  at  that  time
provided for that instrument.89 The institutions of direct democracy were not
introduced in the Small  Constitution enacted in 1947 which regulated the
functions and the term of the Sejm. This law also stated that one of the tasks
of the newly-elected Sejm was the enactment of the new Constitution.90 This
new Constitution would not have to be approved in a popular vote. 
Finally, the Sejm began the work on the new Constitution, which lasted from
1951  to  1952.  The  final  version  of  the  Constitution  draft  was  broadly
consulted with the people. In the so-called national discussion, eleven million
citizens took part in 200 000 meetings.91 It was nevertheless clear from the
beginning that this Constitution would not bring any changes to the already
introduced regime. As it is commonly known, the process of preparing the
draft was not even conducted in a public, open way. The procedures followed
in the  Sejm were of a fictional character. Instead, the decisions concerning
the shape of the new Constitution were often made in small groups of people
(instead of the Parliament) involving the leaders of the Communist regime
84 Henry E. Brady/Cynthia S. Kaplan, p. 182 and Andrzej Paczkowski, p. 74-75.
85 Marian Kallas, p. 271 and  Pawel Borecki, p. 78.
86 Andrzej Paczkowski, p. 76.
87 Ibidem.
88 In  the  literature  published  before  1989  the  referendum results  are  always
quoted  according  to  the  official  authorities'  statement,  after:  Andrzej
Paczkowski, p. 74.
89 Andrzej Paczkowski, p. 67.
90 Pawel Borecki, p. 77.
91 Ibidem, s. 84.
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and in cooperation with the USSR.92 The final outcome of these work was the
Constitution  enacted  on  22  July  1952.  This  Constitution  was  in  fact  an
adaptation of the USSR Constitution regime to the Polish realities. The Polish
names of the main State bodies were kept (such as the Sejm or the Council of
Ministers) but the content of the new Constitution did not reflect any of the
concepts from the Constitutions of 1921 or 1935. The institutions of direct
democracy  were  not  introduced  into  the  system  despite  the  fact  that  a
referendum had already been used in 1946. Such an option was not consider
as the totalitarian system did not provide for any citizens' participation in the
decision-making  process.  The  established  institutional  pattern  was  in  fact
entirely of an anti-democratic character.
3.2.2 Reproduction phase 
With respect to the sequence of events initiated by the critical juncture of
1943, the reproduction phase during which the system entrenched by the
Constitution of 1952 would only reinforce itself, lasted only for a very short
time,  until  1956.  The  system  introduced  created  a  state  similar  to  the
occupation of the Polish territory and for this reason was completely alien to
citizens. Almost right after the end of the production phase, the beginning of
the  reactive  sequences  can  be  observed  (marked  by  citizens'  strong
opposition to the established pattern and the authorities reactions to people's
protests) which basically routed the self-reproducing phase.
The institutional  pattern,  created after the USSR placed Poland within the
Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  did  not  foresee  the  institutions  of  direct
democracy as we understand them today. However, it is interesting to note
that  the  Soviet  doctrine  also  referred  to  direct  democracy  but  in  its
caricatural sense. To underline the fact that the Communist power arose from
the will of the working class, the forms of direct democracy gained a new,
much broader sense.93 This was typical for the Socialist regimes, where many
other institutions were considered to fulfill the role of the direct democracy,
namely,  popular  consultations,  motions  and  petitions,  the  existence  of
political parties, organizations or formalized public discussions and even the
elections of representatives.94 
As a result of this approach, in 1976 a procedure on popular consultations
was even introduced on a constitutional level.95 This institution of non-binding
discussions with the people was considered to be sufficient to involve the
citizens in the decision-making process. However, it needs to be stressed is
that the results of those consultations were not binding for the authorities.
Since the authorities did not face any political responsibility, they were not
even politically forced to respond to people's views. What is more, the results
of the consultations were not even easy to summarize as the citizens merely
stated their opinions and did not choose between given options. 
92 Pawel Borecki, p. 75.
93 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Referendum ogólnokrajowe, p. 100-101.
94 Ibidem  and  Andrzej  Pułło,  W  sprawie  pojęcia  demokracji  bezpośredniej  w
państwie socjalistycznym, Państwo i Prawo, 12 (490)/1986, p. 26 and 31.
95 Jerzy  Jaskiernia,  Ustawowa  regulacja  konsultacji  społecznych  i  referendum,
Państwo i prawo Vol. 7 (497)/1987, p. 7.
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3.2.3 Reactive sequences phase
Soon after the enactment of the Constitution of the People's Republic
of Poland, the economic situation led to protests and political unrest. On 28
June 1956, the workers from Cegielski's factory in Poznan began to strike and
they were brutally suppressed by the army.96 The situation in the country was
very tense. On 8 March 1968, students began protesting after a symbolic ban
on the theater performance of the patriotic "Dziady" by Adam Mickiewicz,
directed by Kazimierz Dejmek in the National Theater in Warsaw. While these
protests were again suppressed by the regime, they influenced the growth of
the opposition.97 Soon, on 12 December 1970, a new strike burst out, as a
response to a significant increase of prices. Strikes began in the Shipyard in
Gdańsk and soon other cities including Szczecin and Gdynia joined in. People
requested the creation of free trade unions. The authorities responded by
using  armed  forces  against  the  demonstrators.  On  24  June  1976,  after
another increase in prices was announced, the workers in Radom, Płock and
Ursus started demonstrating. This time the suppression of protesters was not
as brutal, but it led to political repressions against many of them (including
the  dismissals  from  work).  In  response,  the  opposition  established  the
Workers'  Defence  Committee  (Komitet  Obrony  Robotników,  KOR),  later
renamed to "Committee for Social Self-defence KOR", which aimed at helping
the  fired  or  imprisoned  workers  and  their  families.  The  members  of  this
Committee  also  inspired  the  establishment  of   the  Free  Trade  Unions  in
1978.98
Many historians believe that the election of  Karol  Wojtyła as a new
Pope on 16 October 1978 and his first pilgrimage to Poland (on 2-10 June
1979) strengthened the resolve of the people.99  The ongoing economic crisis
led to a new outburst of strikes in July 1980. The citizens' opposition to the
imposed  system  together  with  the  authorities'  brutal  suppression  of  the
people, eventually led to the following critical juncture.
3.3 Outcome
The  results  of  the  Teheran  Conference  placed  Poland  under  Soviet
influence  with  no  realistic  option  to  avoid  the  Communist  rule.  Those
decisions resulted in a system full of terror and economic instability. Not only
the institutions of direct democracy did not belong in this system, but the
system itself could not even be called democratic. After less than ten years
from  the  moment  of  the  establishment  of  that  system,  the  strikes  and
96 Marian Kallas, p. 275.
97 Ibidem, p. 276.
98 Ibidem, p. 277.
99 Ibidem, p. 278.
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protests that regularly broke out did not allow the Communist regime to fully
stabilize.
The Communist rule showed no respect for the opinion of the people
and the Polish citizens did not identify themselves with that system (hence
the constant existence of underground opposition and strikes). Nevertheless,
this period ended up having a deep impact on shaping political awareness
among the Poles, as it did not give them any opportunity to learn what civil
responsibility  and  civil  society  meant.  This  lack  of  political  education  is
particularly visible even today in the low turnout rates for public votes.100 This
phase further shaped to some extent the mentality of the authorities who still
nowadays seem to distrust the citizens with making decisions for themselves.
4 Phase 3: 14 – 31 August 1980
In  this  part,  the  last  critical  juncture  and  the  path  leading  to  its
outcome will  be analyzed.  As it  was outlined in the previous section,  the
accumulation of strikes and protests on the one hand and the poor economic
state of the country on the other, began to weaken the regime. The resolution
of this conflict between the citizens and the authorities did not result in a
long-term outcome, but instead in the next critical  juncture which set the
institutional trajectory on a path which allowed a moderate inclusion of the
direct democracy institutions into the Polish legal framework. 
It is particularly striking, that Poland, despite the fall of Communism, is
still nowadays on the same path which was set by the events of 1980 with
regard  to  the  regulation  of  direct  democracy  institutions.  This  may  be
surprising as the political changes in 1989 also resulted in the change of the
political  system  in  Poland.  Nevertheless,  the  original  introduction  of  the
institutions of direct democracy in Poland, which took place in 1987 (and was
a  result  of  the  August  1980  events),  affected  their  legal  framework  so
strongly, that no further occurrence, including the political system change,
did  influence  it  since  then.  Naturally,  over  the  years  the  laws  on  these
institutions  were  amended,  the  institution  of  popular  initiative  was  even
introduced - but the general idea behind these institutions, the way they have
been perceived by the authorities and by the citizens, and, most importantly -
their functions, were not transformed.
4.1 Critical juncture and its antecedent conditions
4.1.1 Introduction
The last critical juncture that was observed in the 20th century Poland
consisted of  the events which occurred in August  1980.  This  was a path-
100 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 305.
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breaking  moment  which  influenced the change of  the system and at  the
same time allowed eventually for the institutions of direct democracy to be
introduced,101 which was not evident from the very beginning. In this case,
the tensions in Poland, described in the previous section, led to the crucial
moment  that  changed  the  trajectory  of  Polish  history.  From that  moment
onwards,  it  was  foreseeable  that  the  Soviet  regime  would  be  eventually
abandoned. 
4.1.2 Antecedent conditions
As  pointed  out  earlier,  the  events  of  August  1980  did  not  occur
suddenly. They were the result of the growing social and political tensions.
The  Communist  rule  applied  in  the  People's  Republic  of  Poland  was  not
accepted by the citizens. The people started responding with protests against
the terror and oppression. A new wave of strikes began in July 1980, due to
the increase of prices, but it was also a response to the degenerating political
and economic system. Finally  the protests  reached their  climax in August
1980. 
4.1.3 Critical juncture
The strikes took place on the whole  Poland’s  territory  and soon an
Inter-enterprise Strike Committee was established, with Lech Wałęsa as its
leader.  The  Committee  summarized  the  strikers'  demands  which  were
denided the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
However, the development of the events forced the authorities to begin the
negotiations with the Strike Committee.102  As a result, the so-called "August
Agreements"  or  "Gdańsk  Agreements"  (Porozumienia  sierpniowe or
Porozumienia Gdańskie) were signed on 31 August 1980. Their significance
was extraordinary. The Communist authority concluded for the first time a
social  contract  with  the  people  which  had  legal  consequences.  The
Communist Government agreed that new trade unions could be registered
and not discriminated against.103 This allowed creation of the first free trade
union NSZZ Solidarność, which acted as the political opposition.
The  critical  juncture  itself  can  be  characterized  by  a  relative
contingency, as the result of the strikes could not have been foreseen at the
moment of their  breakout.  The economic situation in the country and the
difficulties the Communists faced (also abroad) were not without bearing on
101 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Ustawowa regulacja, p. 15, Jerzy Kuciński, Polskie referendum
29 listopada 1987  r.,  Państwo i  prawo,  Vol.  2  (516)/1989,  p.  45  and Jerzy
Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe i społeczno-polityczne doświadczenia referendum
z  29  listopada  1987  r.,  in:  Danuta  Waniek/Michał  T.  Staszewski  (ed.),
Referendum w Polsce współczesnej, Warszawa 1995, p. 77-78. 
102 Marian Kallas, p. 279. 
103 Ibidem.
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the choices of the actors, namely the Communist authorities and the leaders
of the opposition. These choices were rooted in the historical occurrences of
the time and due to this they were not random. However, the scenarios of
these events and their development could have been various, such as for
instance the USSR responding with a military suppression and not leaving the
suppression of the strikes to the Polish authorities only. 
This  moment  in  Polish  history  is  considered  to  be  deterministic  in
respect of the reintroduction of the democratic system. This event in itself
does not entail an automatic introduction of direct democracy mechanisms.
Nevertheless, without this point in history - without such a strong opposition
of the Polish Nation - the mentioned changes could not have ensued. Polish
historians agree on the fact that the events of August 1980, and also the
subsequent foundation of the first free trade union (which functioned as a
formally legal political opposition) on 17 September 1980, were one of the
most important events in the Polish 20th century history.104 In relation to the
development  of  the  direct  democracy  institutions,  the  Communists'
perception of Poland changed and led to the gradual introduction of tools that
would involve the people in the decision-making process.
4.2 Path-dependent process
4.2.1 Production phase
While the Communist  regime tried to suppress people again and to
destroy the opposition by introducing martial law on 13 December 1981,105
the turnaround could not be reversed. The sequence of events that followed
eventually  formed  a  new  system  and  laid  the  foundations  for   direct
democracy mechanisms.
At that time, the necessity to introduce some democratic features into
the system started to be perceived as imminent by the Communists.  The
direct democracy mechanisms were supposed to prevent the future social
and political crises.106 One of the solutions discussed was the introduction of
referendums on both, local and national level. This option was accepted by
the  ruling  Communist  Party,  the  Polish  United  Workers'  Party  (Polska
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza,  PZPR) and was entered into its program.107
The introduction of the institution of  legislative popular initiative was also
104 Ibidem, p. 278.
105 The martial  law (stan wojenny)  lasted until  December 31st,  1982 when the
State's Council's resolution from 19 December 1982, suspending the martial
law application  came into  force.  It  was finally  lifted on  July  22nd,  1983,  as
provided for by the State's Council resolution from 20 July 1943; Marian Kallas,
p. 284.
106 Jerzy  Jaskiernia,  Ustawowa  regulacja,  p.  3  and  Jerzy  Kucinski,  Polskie
referendum, p. 45. 
107 Anna  Rytel-Warzocha,  Referendum  ogólnokrajowe,  p.  103,  Jerzy  Kuciński,
Polskie referendum, p. 45 and  Henry E. Brady/Cynthia S. Kaplan, p. 184.
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proposed  in  the  constitutional  law  doctrine,  but  this  idea  was  not
implemented.108 
The first draft of the law on the referendum was prepared in 1984 by
the Patriotic Movement for National Revival (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia
Narodowego, PRON), a procommunist political organization created in 1982 to
demonstrate social support for the Communist Government (however, some
of its members also belonged to the Communist Party). The discussion over
the  final  version  and  various  legislative  options  lasted  for  four  years.109
Finally,  in  1987  a  draft  of  the  law  on  the  popular  consultations  and
referendum was submitted to the  Sejm by a group of 115 Deputies. In its
justification, they stressed that those institutions should be introduced to fully
implement socialist democracy and to broaden the participation of the people
in the power wielding.110 This statement was also mentioned in the preamble
to  the  final  law  of  6  May  1987  on  the  popular  consultations  and
referendum.111 
During  the  parliamentary  debates,  various  options  were  analyzed.
Some Deputies opted for the introduction of an obligatory referendum, but
this option was rejected before even a consensus was reached with regard to
the matters that would be subject to such an obligatory referendum.112 It was
also considered, whether the referendum should be introduced only at the
local level, as the Board of the  Sejm Advisors proposed. After all, the  Sejm
Commission  which  worked  on  the  final  draft  of  the  law  stated  that  the
introduction  of  a  nation-wide  referendum  was  necessary  to  broaden  the
citizens'  possibilities  to  state  their  opinions  on  various  topics.113 Another
dispute  evolved  on  the  notion  of  the  character  of  the  referendum  and
whether it should be consultative as opposed to binding. The draft submitted
by the Deputies provided for a binding referendum. However, it introduced a
requirement that the result of the referendum would only be binding when
more than a half of the people entitled to take part in it voted in favor of a
particular option. This proposal was eventually chosen for the final version of
the law.114 Such a prerequisite for the binding force of the referendum should
be considered as extremely restrictive. This point of view was also mentioned
during the parliamentary debates, but the majority of the Deputies claimed
that if the referendum result was to be binding, it should be certain that the
majority of the people entitled to make a decision, supported the particular
option chosen.115    
108 Piotr Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ustawodawczej
przez obywateli, Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 4 (39)/2000, p. 48 citing A. Szmyt, W
sprawie inicjatywy ustawodawczej, RPEiS, Vol. 2/1986, p. 100.
109 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Ustawowa regulacja, p. 3-4, Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Referendum
ogólnokrajowe, p. 103-104 and Jerzy Kucinski, Polskie referendum, p. 45. 
110 Jerzy  Jaskiernia,  Ustawowa  regulacja,  p.  4  and  Jerzy  Jaskiernia,
Prawnoustrojowe, p. 78-79.
111 Dz.U. 1987.14.83.
112 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Ustawowa regulacja, p. 13.
113 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 79.
114 Jerzy  Jaskiernia,  Ustawowa  regulacja,  p.  13-14  and  Jerzy  Jaskiernia,
Prawnoustrojowe, p. 82-83.
115 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Ustawowa regulacja, p. 14.
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On  6  May  1987,  the  day  of  the  adoption  of  the  law  on  popular
consultations and referendum (thereafter "the 1987 law"), the Constitution of
the People's Republic of Poland was also amended. The change introduced in
Article 2  of  the Constitution provided for  the people's  participation in  the
decision-making process through the institution of referendum. The institution
itself was to be regulated in an act of law.
The  law  on  popular  consultations  and  referendum  introduced  the
institution of  facultative  popular  consultations  and facultative  referendum.
Neither of these institutions could be applied to issues relating to security or
defense  of  the  country  and the  armed forces  of  the  People's  Republic  of
Poland, nor to issues considered as a State secret (Article 4 of the law on
popular consultations and referendum). This law actually only broadened the
application possibilities for the popular consultations, as this mechanism had
already been introduced in the 1970s. When the new law came into force, not
only the citizens, but also the Patriotic Movement for National Revival, other
political  organizations,  local  authorities,  trade  unions,  farmers',  women's,
sport  and  various  other  organizations  were  entitled  to  participate  in  the
consultations.  Therefore,  according  to  Article  5  of  the  law  on  popular
consultations and referendum, a particular citizen's voice could actually be
heard twice: by him/her stating his own opinion and through the organization
to which he/she belonged.116 The consultations could be launched either  ex
officio by the entitled authority (i.e. the Sejm, the State Council, the Council
of Ministers or the Prime Minister and Ministers at the national level and by
the local authorities at the local level) or by these same authorities but upon
a motion requesting consultations, filed by national or local (depending on
the  range  of  the  consultations)  agencies  of  the  Patriotic  Movement  for
National Revival (Articles 7 and 8 of the 1987 law). The scope of the issues
that could be submitted to consultations was wide and ranged from general
guidelines to proposals of acts of law or their particular provisions issued by
the authority launching the consultations (Article 7 of the 1987 law).
The referendum,  on the  other  hand,  was  introduced into the Polish
legislation for the first time,117 as the referendums conducted in 1946 were
based on laws enacted only for a one-time purpose. According to Article 12
(1)  of  the  1987  law,  only  the  citizens  possessing  voting  rights  in
parliamentary elections and residing in Poland at the time of the vote were
eligible  to  participate in the nation-wide referendum. With  regard to local
referendum, Article 12 (2) provided that citizens registered for a permanent
stay on the territory subject to the vote, were entitled to participate in it. The
authorities  empowered  to  launch  a  referendum  were  the  Sejm (for  the
national  referendum)  and  the  local  National  Council  (for  the  local
referendum). Both of these bodies needed a majority of at least 2/3 of the
votes in a presence of at least half of all Deputies to make a decision in this
matter (Article 14 (1) - (3) of the 1987 law). These authorities could act either
on their  own or  upon a motion filed by the State  Council,  the Council  of
Ministers, National Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Revival (in
the case of the national referendum) and the Presidiums of National Councils,
local  state authorities and Councils  of the Patriotic Movement for National
116 Ibidem, p. 7.
117 Ibidem, p. 11.
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Revival (in case of the local referendum), as provided by Article 15 of the
1987 law. In a national referendum, the  Sejm could submit either precisely
formulated issues or specific legal options for legislative drafts which related
to main areas of State activity.  Local  referendums were to be launched in
relation to local issues or options adopted for the local acts of law (Article 14
(1) and (2) of the 1987 law). The lack of the provisions allowing the people
(the  sovereign)  to  launch  the  referendum  (for  instance  by  formulating  a
binding  motion  that  would  be  filed  with  the  Sejm)  was  criticized  in  the
literature.118 It  was  therefore  still  the  Communist  authorities  that  were  to
decide if the sovereign could express their view or make a binding decision
(depending on the turnout) through the referendum.
The 1987 law - even before it entered into force - was considered to be
a proof of the changes that had begun in the People's Republic of Poland in
1980, as it was the authorities' answer to the people's protests. The changes
were not considered radical, as it had taken over seven years for this law to
be passed and the future practical use of consultations or referendums was
not  expected  to  be  significant.119 However,  the  institution  of  the  local
referendum seemed much more promising to scholars at  the time. It  was
easier and less expensive to carry out (because of its limited territorial scope)
and  had  the  potential  to  make  the  people  co-responsible  for  their  local
communities.120
To the surprise of some scholars, the law on national referendum was
soon  put  in  practice.121 On  7  October  1987,  the  National  Council  of  the
Patriotic Movement for National Revival filed a motion with the Speaker of the
Sejm for  the  lower  chamber  of  the  Parliament  to  consider  launching  a
referendum on economic reforms and democratization of public life. The aim
of this motion was to let the Polish citizens take a stand on the structure and
content of the "Polish path to Socialism."122 The Communist Party supported
this referendum as the country faced an economic crisis. It was certain that
significant reforms could not be introduced in traditional fashion,123 without
the consent of the people as this could lead to a severe political unrest. The
Sejm's resolution on launching the nation-wide referendum was taken already
three days later, on 10 October 1987. It did not formulate yet any particular
questions (those were supposed to be established in a further resolution) but
only stated that the subject of the referendum would be further reforms of
the  state  and  the  economy.  The  date  of  the  referendum was  set  for  29
November 1987.124
118 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 87 and Michał T. Staszewski, Referendum
oprotestowane, in: Danuta Waniek/Michał T. Staszewski, Referendum w Polsce
współczesnej, Warszawa 1995, p. 91.
119 Jerzy  Jaskiernia,  Ustawowa  regulacja,  p.  15  and  Jerzy  Jaskiernia,
Prawnoustrojowe, p. 77-78.
120 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Ustawowa regulacja, p. 15
121 Jerzy Kuciński, Polskie referendum, p. 46. 
122 Ibidem, p. 46-47.
123 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 86.
124 Resolution of the Sejm, M.P. 232.30.1987, Jerzy Kucinski, Polskie referendum,
p. 47.
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The actual questions were only formulated about two weeks later, on
23 October 1987.  The lower chamber of Parliament decided in its resolution
to  ask  the  people  the  following  questions:  (1)  Do  you  support  the  full
implementation of the radical program of economy reforms presented in the
Sejm, which leads to a significant improvement in society's living conditions
but involves a difficult period of adjustment lasting two or three years? and
(2) Do you support the Polish model of deep democratization of political life,
which aims at strengthening self-governance, broadening citizens' rights and
increasing  their  participation  in  ruling  the  country?125 The  referendum
campaign had started even before the two questions were formulated and
lasted only 37 days. It was considered to be too short, especially due to the
complexity  of  the questions  posed126 and to the fact  that  it  was the first
referendum in over forty years.
On the referendum day, 67,32% of people entitled to participate in the
vote, took part in it. The majority of the participants gave positive answers to
both questions (66,04% for  the first  question and 69,03% for  the second
question).127 While such a high participation rate may be a sign of success of
the  referendum,  its  result  was  not  binding  because  the  number  of  votes
supporting either of the options did not exceed the threshold which required
that half  of  the citizens entitled to take part in the referendum support a
given option. 
Some commentators criticized again this law as being too strict and
harmful  to  citizens  who  had  chosen  to  be  active  in  the  decision-making
process, as the binding result of the referendum depended on people who
actually  refused to participate in  it.128 Despite  this  criticism some authors
considered this particular referendum to be a sign of a new quality on the
Polish political scene.129 Barcikowski considered that this referendum differed
significantly from the referendums and plebiscites launched in Poland until
then. This time the voting was not treated by the people (or at least by the
majority of the voters) as a confidence vote for the authorities but rather as
an opportunity to give their opinion on the issues presented.130 On the other
hand, it  must be pointed out that the questions for this referendum were
formulated  in  such  an  unclear  and  enigmatic  way  that  it  could  not  be
determined with certainty to what exactly the citizens were agreeing to.131
Therefore,  the  formulation  of  the  questions  did  not  fulfill  the  democratic
standards and did not  allow the people to  participate meaningfully in  the
decision-making process. 
At first, it appeared that referendums would be used more often from
then on, as the Polish United Workers'  Party declared that the referendum
125 Resolution of the Sejm, M.P. 245.32.1987.
126 Jerzy Kucinski, Polskie referendum, p. 50.
127 Ibidem, p. 51-52.
128 Ibidem, p. 52 citing Z. Mank, Pułapki superdemokracji, Gazeta prawnicza, Vol.
50/1987, p. 12 and Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 86-87.
129 Jerzy  Kuciński,  Polskie  referendum,  p.  54  citing  A.  Barcikowski,  Polskie
referendum  -  nowe  doświadczenia  socjalistycznej  demokracji,  Ideologia  i
polityka, Vol. 1/1988, p. 30-31. 
130 Ibidem, p. 30-31.
131 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 86.
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was included in the socialistic democracy to allow the population to state its
opinion.132 The 1987 Polish referendum raised also interest in this form of
governance in the USSR. During the 19th Union Conference of the Communist
Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  the  leaders  stressed  the  importance  of  direct
democracy processes, especially on the local level. However, time has proven
the  assumption  on  the  future  popularity  of  the  referendum to  be  wrong.
Therefore, one can assume that in fact the Communist authorities did not
really want people to participate broadly in the decision-making process. Not
only  were the requirements for  the binding result  of  the referendum very
strict, but also the opposition had no real possibility to launch a referendum
or  to  submit  a  motion  to  the  State  bodies  for  the  mere  consideration  of
launching a referendum. 
This  referendum was also a sign that  the nation-wide changes that
began in 1980 were still enduring. Some authors claimed that a fairly high
percentage of voters who gave negative answers to the questions asked was
yet another sign of an on-growing discrepancy between the public opinion
and  the  Communist  authorities.133 Most  importantly,  the  structure  of  the
referendum  created  in  1987  laid  the  foundations  for  direct  democracy
institutions in the Third Republic of Poland. The institutional pattern provoked
by the 1980 critical juncture and described in this production phase provided
for the inclusion of the institutions of direct democracy in the legal system in
order to give the citizens the impression that they had an influence on the
choices made by the authorities. These institutions were constructed in a way
which did not allow the citizens to effectively take part in the decision-making
process.
4.2.2 Reproduction phase
This section describes how the institutional pattern created after 1980,
namely  the  inclusion  in  the  legal  system  of  a  limited  version  of  direct
democracy mechanisms, repeated itself throughout time. These institutions,
despite the numerous amendments, do not allow citizens until today to take
action and to effectively supplement the representative political system. The
changes introduced by the Legislature into the laws regulating the institutions
of  referendum  and  popular  initiative  were  not  aimed  at  changing  this
situation, but rather at creating an impression that the authorities are trying
to reform the system. They have never, however, had any incentive to do so.
Further, the citizens have not shown for a long time any discontent with this
status quo. 
As this section deals with numerous direct democracy laws introduced
since the end of the 1980s, it has been divided into four subsections for a
clearer description of the process. First, the direct consequences of the fall of
the Communism are discussed. Second, the formation of the new democratic
Constitution  is  dealt  with.  The  legal  framework  of  the  direct  democracy
mechanisms introduced by the 1987 law prevails  in  this  Constitution with
132 Jerzy Kucinski, Polskie referendum, p. 54-55.
133 Jerzy Jaskiernia, Prawnoustrojowe, p. 87-88.
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only slight adjustments to the new political system. Subsequently, the reform
of the direct democracy laws is presented. The changes introduced by this
reform did  not,  however,  influence the character  of  the direct  democracy
mechanisms  implemented  in  Poland.  In  the  last  part  of  this  section,  the
practical  aspects  of  the  application  of  direct  democracy  mechanisms  are
described, showing the activity in this field of both, the authorities and the
people.
4.2.2.1.1 The fall of the Communism
The  creation  of  free  trade  unions  and  the  introduction  of  the
institutions of  direct  democracy in the limited scope was not sufficient  to
calm the people. The leaders of the opposition saw the opportunity to put the
Communists under more pressure and they acted upon it by means of strikes.
This difficult situation in the country led the Communists to start negotiations
with the opposition. The economic crisis was deteriorating and they needed
at least some social support to be able to engage in the reforms, as it was the
people who would have to bear the costs of those reforms. After a series of
strikes,  which  took  place  in  April-May,  August  and  December  1988,  a
breakthrough point appeared in 1989 with the fall of the Communism.134  
In this case, however, this particular moment in time did not constitute
another critical juncture nor even was it a part of the reactive sequence in
relation to the development of the direct democracy institutions. It would not
result in a change of the trajectory in the development of the institutions of
direct democracy. This moment in time was not contingent; it was a direct
result  of  the changes that  began with  a  critical  juncture  in  August  1980.
Nevertheless, even if we bear in mind that contingency must not necessary
be a characteristic of a critical juncture,135 in 1989 the choices of the political
actors were already determined by the previous events and were not that
broad. For the opposition, it was obvious that the people would not accept
any other political  system but a democratic one. The institutions of direct
democracy were already introduced as a result of the 1980 events. Therefore,
revoking  them  could  be  regarded  as  moving  a  step  backwards  in  the
development of the system and could not be easily accepted by the people
(they could have treated it as a potential attack on their rights). Besides, the
opposition did not even consider limiting people's rights.  At that time, there
was no political pressure (originating from the population) nor a need (felt on
behalf  of  the  opposition)  to  widen  the  scope  of  the  direct  democracy
institution. As it will be shown later, the further, yet limited, development of
the  direct  democracy  institutions  was  strongly  marked  by  their  primary
construct, which was a result of the 1980 events. This way again in 1989, as
in 1918, Poland found itself at a historical point where decisions about the
future  shape  of  its  system  had  to  be  made.  Nonetheless,  this  time  the
direction of the changes concerning direct democracy institutions was already
134 Marek  Dobrowolski,  Ustrój  państwa  w  porozumieniach  Okrągłego  Stołu,
Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 3 (92)/2009, s. 78.
135 James Mahoney/Daniel Schensul, p. 462.
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set by the events of 1980. Therefore, the events of 1989 had no bearing on
the shape of the direct democracy institutions as their structure would remain
a  relic  of  the  former  political  system.  From  this  moment  onwards,  the
structures  of  the  direct  democracy  institutions,  including  even  the  newly
introduced popular initiative, were, as it may be observed, repetitions and
variations of the institutional concept created in the 1980s.
On 7 April 1989, the Constitution of 1952 was amended to mark the
official change of the political system in the country. The Parliament elected
in June 1989 engaged in parliamentary works on the new Constitution but did
not succeed in agreeing on the final version of the draft. Possibly, it was due
to the fact that the Parliament, whose Deputies were partially (65% of the
seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament, the Sejm) appointed by the old
regime, did not have people's legitimization to enact the new Constitution
which  was  to  be  the  legal  base  of  the  political  system  of  a  finally  free
country.136 
At  the  same  time,  a  new  debate  over  launching  nation-wide
referendums started, among others on the question whether the Parliament
should enact the new Constitution, or if it should be enacted by the new, fully
free-elected Parliament. The Deputies also wanted to ask the population if the
second chamber of  the  Parliament –  the  Senat -  should  exist  in  the new
political  system  and  if  the  term  of  the  present  Parliament  should  be
shortened.  The  idea  of  the  referendum  was  supported  by  the  left-wing
parties,  including  the  authors  of  the  motion  to  launch  a  referendum,  the
Deputies'  Club of  the  Democratic  Party  (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne,  SD),
who claimed that such crucial questions should be put to the sovereign.137
The majority of the Deputies did not agree to launch this referendum - they
insisted that the costs would be too high and that it could interfere with the
Presidential elections138 (that were to be held in 1990; this referendum was
supposed to be launched on the day of the elections139). Some Deputies also
stated that  launching a referendum would require  a long preparation and
citizens'  education,  as  the  people  did  not  understand the  institution  of  a
referendum.140
Another issue that needed to be urgently regulated in the opinion of
many Deputies was the right to abortion. During the times of  Communist
regime, the law on abortion (dating back to 1956) was very liberal and the
debates about the introduction of stricter provisions began already in June
1989. Many Deputies wanted the people to decide on the new abortion law
through the referendum but the Episcopate and the conservative parties were
136 Janina Zakrzewska, Spór o konstytucję, Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 3/1993, p. 27-
28.
137 Marcin  Rachwał,  Demokracja  bezpośrednia,  p.  188  and  Michał  T.
Staszewski/Jacek  B.  Falski,  Referendum w praktyce  parlamentarnej  X,  I  i  II
kadencji  Sejmu  Rzeczypospolitej  Polskiej,  in:  Michal  T.  Staszewski/Danuta
Waniek (ed.), Referendum w Polsce i w Europie Wschodniej, Warszawa 1996, p.
14.
138 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 189.
139 Michał T. Staszewski/Jacek B. Falski, p. 12. 
140 Ibidem, p. 14.
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not willing to submit such matters to the vote of the people.141 After all, in
January 1991, the Sejm launched popular consultations on this matter. Over
1 700 000 people took part in this process but the result was not conclusive,
as there was no particular question to be answered and people merely stated
their  general  opinion.142 In  the  end,  the referendum was not  launched as
conservative opinions, strongly influenced by the Episcopate, prevailed in the
Parliament.143 
These episodes are worth recalling as they show that, already at the
beginning of the existence of the Third Republic of Poland, the Sejm decisions
with regard to launching referendums were not meant to give the people the
right  to  decide  on  crucial  issues,  but  were  rather  used  instrumentally  to
achieve political ends. This attitude already then proved that the 1989 events
and the future adoption of the new Constitution could not change much in
reference  to  the  design  of  the  direct  democracy  mechanisms  introduced
previously, but instead it would just keep duplicating their previous form.
4.2.2.1.2 The  New  Constitution  and  the  old  legal
framework of direct democracy
It took a long time for the works on the new Constitution to fully begin.
The Parliament entirely free-elected in 1991 finally took up this task. Although
there were plans to enact the new Constitution on the 3 May 1991, on the
200 years anniversary of the enactment of the 3 May  Constitution of 1791,
those plans were not followed up by any significant actions. Some authors
even  assumed that  the  Polish  history  taught  the  Polish  Nation  to  get  by
without established Constitutions that would guarantee the citizens' rights,
and so, no one felt the pressure to change the status quo.144 Temporary laws
were thus enacted to set the provisional structure of the political system for
the time during which the new Constitution would be prepared. On 23 April
1992,  the Parliament passed a law solely  regulating the procedure of  the
enactment of the new Constitution (thereafter "the April 1992 law"). This law
regulated also, in the Article 2a, amended on 22 April  1994,145 the first in
Polish history popular initiative. This provision provided for the right of  500
000 citizens to submit their draft  of  the Constitution.146 This initiative was
foreseen only for this one particular instance and the people's proposal would
not  be  directly  submitted  to  popular  voting  but  subject  to  parliament's
legislative procedure. It should, therefore, not be considered as a significant
step  forward  in  the  creation  of  the  direct  democratic  institutions.  On  17
October 1992, another so-called Small Constitution was enacted, namely the
141 Michal T. Staszewski, p. 91.
142 Ibidem, p. 92.
143 Ibidem, p. 92-96.
144 Janina Zakrzewska, p. 27.
145 Dz.U.1994.61.251.
146 Piotr Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku, p. 47 and Paweł Sarnecki, Idee przewodnie
Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Przegląd Sejmowy
5(22)/1997, p. 21.
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Constitutional Act on the relations between the Legislature and the Executive
(thereafter "the October 1992 law").147 
These  above-mentioned  legal  acts  provided  for  three  types  of
referendum - a constitutional one (an obligatory referendum for a ratification
of  a  new Constitution  stated  by  the  April  1992  law)  and  two  kinds  of  a
facultative referendums - on the rules governing future Constitution (Article
2c of the April 1992 law) and on important issues (Article 19 of the October
1992  law).  The  constitutional  referendum  was  to  be  launched  by  the
President and it did not require a quorum. The Constitution would be ratified
if the majority of the voters supported it (Article 11 (1) of the April 1992 law).
The  facultative  referendum  could  be  organized  either  upon  the  Sejm's
decision or upon the President's initiative with the Senat's consent and would
be  binding  only  if  more  than  a  half  of  all  eligible  voters  participated.
Otherwise the referendum only had a consultative character,  as stated by
Article 19 of the October 1992 law. Article 72 (2) of the Small Constitution
was also a legal base for the local referendums.148
During the Parliamentary work in 1995, the Labor Union Party (Unia
Pracy) suggested that an ante legem referendum on the issues related to the
future shape of the constitution should be launched, as the results of such a
referendum would be useful in preparing the final parliamentary draft of the
Constitution.  Eventually,  the required amount of  Deputies'  votes (absolute
majority of the members of joined Parliament chambers) was not gathered
and the referendum did not take place.149  
The new full law on referendums, which replaced the law of 1987, was
provided for in the law on referendum of 29 June 1995 (thereafter "the 1995
law").150 During the parliamentary work, a sub-commission was established
(created by the members of the  Sejm's  Legislative Commission and Justice
Commission) to prepare the draft law on the referendum. On the plenum of
this sub-commission, it was concluded that the new act should provide for a
general  type  of  referendum,  instead  of  only  a  constitutional  one  as  was
previously suggested by some Deputies.151 This law on referendum regulated
all types of the referendums that could be carried out at the national level,
according to the two above-mentioned Constitutional Acts that were then in
force.  The  referendums  were  divided  according  to  their  subject  matter,
namely: a constitutional referendum (including an obligatory referendum on
the ratification of the Constitution and a facultative  ante legem referendum
on the basic principles governing the future Constitution) and a facultative
referendum on important issues. Both of the constitutional referendums were
based on  the  Constitutional  Act  of  23  April  1992 and the  1995  law  only
referred to the already existing provisions of that act, stating additionally who
147 Dz.U.1992.84.426.
148 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia w Polsce po 1989 r., Przegląd
Sejmowy, Vol. 1 (72)/2006, p. 11.
149 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 192-195.
150 Dz.U.1995.99.487.
151 Józef Repel, Nowa ustawa o referendum, Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 2 (19)/1997,
p. 23-24.
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is eligible to participate in these referendums. The facultative referendum on
important issues had its legal base in the Constitutional Act of 17 October
1992. The referendum on important issues could, therefore, still be launched
either by the Sejm or by the President with consent of the Senat (Article 4 (1)
of the 1995 law). The Sejm could make this decision either ex officio or upon
a motion coming from the Senat, the Council of Ministers or a group of 500
000 citizens (Article 5 (1) and 6 (1) of the 1995 law). The citizens were not,
however, equipped with any legal tools that would allow them to influence
the Sejm's proceeding with their motion.
The  1995  law  on  referendum  was  used  once  in  practice.  On  18
February 1996 a popular vote on various privatization aspects was held. The
privatization of the State property was a difficult process in all of the post-
Soviet  countries.  The  public  companies  operating  during  the  Communist
times were built with a forced support of all of the citizens. Therefore, the
transformation of the ownership system was necessary. In Poland, it started in
1990,  after  the  enactment  of  the  law  on  the  privatization  of  the  public
entities, when the shares in five major State-owned companies were put up
for  sale.  Apart  from  that,  other  privatization  programs  were  also
introduced.152 Nevertheless, the NSZZ Solidarność, criticizing these processes
(stating that not all of the State companies are included in them, as well as
not all of the citizens could benefit from the privatization), submitted a trade
union proposal regulating the privatization processes, according to which all
of the citizens would be the beneficiaries of the privatization and most of the
State  property  would  be  subject  to  it.  The  referendum on  this  issue  was
ordered by the President (with the Senat's consent). The President formulated
the  first,  very  broad  question,  namely:  Do  you  support  a  popular
enfranchisement (uwłaszczenie) of the citizens? 
In response to this, the Sejm also decided to launch a referendum on
privatization  and  formulated  the  following  four  questions  which  were
supposed to specify the first presidential question:153 (1) Do you agree that
the obligations towards the pensioners and the public employees, which arise
from  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  judgments,  should  be  satisfied  from  the
privatized State's property?; (2) Do you agree that the part of the privatized
State property should be included into the National Pension Fund?; (3) Do you
agree that the share certificates of the National Investment Fund should be
increased by including in the Fund further enterprises?; and (4) Do you agree
that the privatization vouchers (bon prywatyzacyjny) should be included in
the privatization process?
While  the  Sejm's  questions  were  meant  to  clarify  the  question
formulated  by  the  President,  they  themselves  were  very  unclear,  as  the
Deputies  used  many  imprecise  words,  such  as  "the  public  employees"
(without giving a definition of that term) or "fulfilling the obligations resulting
from the Constitutional Tribunal judgments" (even though the judgements did
not precisely stipulate those obligations).154 Both referendums were to take
place  on  the  same day -  18  February  1996.  The  people's  interest  in  the
referendum was relatively low. As commentators stated, it was due to the
152 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 166-167.
153 Ibidem, p. 168-169.
154 Ibidem, p. 173-174.
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complexity and lack of clarity of the questions. Further, the President Lech
Wałęsa was not re-elected for the second term at the end of 1995, which
resulted in a limited referendum campaign of the presidential office.155 The
referendum campaign was in general described as inadequate and chaotic.
Some authors also stated that this referendum was in fact used by the NSZZ
Solidarność  as  a  plebiscite,  to  show  that  the  trade  union  was  still  an
important  political  actor.156 The  participation  rate  in  the  President's
referendum amounted to 32,40% and in the  Sejm's referendum to 32,44%.
The referendum results were therefore not binding. In response to the first,
second,  third  and  fifth  question,  the  participants  gave  positive  answers
(respectively: 94,54%, 92,89%, 93,70% and 88,30% valid votes in favor). The
fourth question was answered negatively - with only 21,86% valid votes in
favor.157 This particular referendum experience could not be portrayed as a
good democratic lesson for the citizens.  The citizens were not  sufficiently
informed  about  the  issues  at  stake.  Further,  experts  themselves  had
difficulties in understanding the questions posed in the referendum.        
The provisions  on local  referendums were provided  for  even earlier
than the laws on the nation-wide referendums, namely in the law of 8 March
1990 on local government, which was soon supplemented by the law of 11
October  1991  on  community  referendum.158 This  latter  law  had  to  be
introduced,  as  the  law  on  popular  consultations  and  referendum  was  no
longer  adequate  to  regulate  the  local  referendums  in  the  new  historical
context. Both laws provided for the referendum on important local matters,
for referendums on self-taxation of the community, for the institution of the
recall  of  the  local  council  (the  only  local  body  at  that  time coming from
popular elections) and for the popular initiative for launching a referendum.
The decisions on self-taxation and on the recall of authorities could be made
only by means of a referendum. In relation to those issues, the referendum
was  of  an  obligatory  character  (Article  1  (3)  of  the  law  on  community
referendum). The motion for such a popular vote was binding if it was signed
by 1/10 of the eligible voters from the said community (Article 13 (1) of the
law on local government). The time for the collection of the signatures was
limited to only 60 days counted from the moment of the notification filed with
the  governor  of  the  community  (Article  10  (1)  of  the  law  on  local
government).  The  referendums on  important  matters  and  on  self-taxation
could  also  be  launched  by  the  Community  Council  acting  ex  officio.  The
prerequisites governing the use if this institution in 1991 were yet not too
demanding,  as  for  the  referendum  to  be  valid,  the  participation  of  30%
eligible voters was required. It was conclusive when over a half of the valid
votes favored a particular option (with the exception of self-taxation, where
the referendum would only be conclusive when 2/3 of votes were cast in favor
or against a particular option). 
The initial requirements for the recall referendum introduced by the act
on local government were more severe, as that act required 1/5 of the eligible
voters to sign the motion for the launching of the recall referendum. For this
155 Ibidem, p. 174.
156 Ibidem, p. 176.
157 Ibidem, p. 175.
158 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 12.
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referendum to be valid, at least 50% of the eligible voters had to take part in
it. These requirements were, however, repealed on 14 December 1991 by the
virtue of the law on community referendum159 and from then onwards the
prerequisites for the validity of the recall vote were the same as in the case of
the other local referendums.
These laws on the direct democracy institutions were based on the
Constitutional Acts of only a provisional character, which could not replace
the  regular,  stable  Constitution.  The  actual  legislative  process  on  the
enactment of the new Constitution started when the Presidential proposal for
a  new Constitution  was  submitted to  the  Sejm in  March 1992.  This  draft
provided  only  for  a  constitutional  referendum.  The  first  two  Deputies
proposals for the new Constitution were submitted in December 1992 (one
was submitted by a group of Deputies from a few political parties, i.a. the
Democratic  Union,  the  Work  Union  and  Centre  Agreement  and  the  other
proposal  was  submitted  by  the  conservative  party,  namely  the  Christian
National  Union).  Both  proposals  also  included  the  institution  of  a
constitutional  referendum.  The  former  proposal  foresaw  the  constitutional
referendum as the final stage of the adoption of the Constitution. The latter
proposal, submitted by the conservative party, provided for a constitutional
referendum  only  in  a  case  when  the  President  refused  to  sign  the  new
Constitution.160 
Some of  the  other  Deputies'  drafts  contained  proposals  for  a  more
developed and broader referendum mechanism, none of the proposals were,
however,  ground-breaking.161 In  1993,  seven Constitution drafts  containing
the  direct  democracy  institutions  were  submitted  to  the  Sejm.  As  it  was
stated  in  the  literature,  all  of  these proposals  had  one  thing  in  common,
namely  their  authors  wanted  to  entrench  direct  democracy  in  the  legal
system but did not treat these instruments as tools allowing the citizens to
perform their  sovereign  functions.162 A  right  to  referendum,  as  a  general
constitutional  principle,  was  provided  for  by  the  drafts  presented  by  the
President,  the  Senat,  the  left-wing  party  Democratic  Left  Alliance  (Sojusz
Lewicy  Demokratycznej,  SLD)  and  Christian  Democratic  Party  Centre
Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum, PC). Other proposals contained various
forms of referendum (a facultative referendum on repealing a law amending
the Constitution, a consultative referendum on particularly important political
decisions  and  an  obligatory  constitutional  referendum).  All  of  the  major
political parties agreed, however, on the character of the citizens' motion for
launching of the referendum; it was meant to be non-binding.163 
The citizens' right to submit a draft law by the means of a popular
initiative  institution  was  suggested  in  many  drafts.  Two  of  them  were
prepared respectively by the Senat and by the President (in both drafts 100
000 signatures were required). The others were submitted by various political
159 Dz. U.1991.110.473.
160 Janina Zakrzewska, p. 28-29.
161 Ibidem,  p.  35  and  Eugeniusz  Zieliński,  Referendum  w  państwie
demokratycznym, in: Danuta Waniek/Michał T. Staszewski (ed.), Referendum w
Polsce współczesnej, Warszawa 1995, p. 40-41.
162 Eugeniusz Zielinski, p. 40-41
163 Ibidem and Andrzej Kulig/Bogumil Naleziński, p. 31.
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parties,  namely:  the SLD (with  a requirement of  150 000 signatures),  the
Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD, with a requirement of 2 000 000
signatures),  the  the  Confederation  of  Independent  Poland  (Konfederacja
Polski Niepodleglej, KPN, with a requirement of 100 000 signatures) and the
Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL)  in collaboration with
the Labor Union Party (Unia Pracy, UP). These two latter parties prepared a
joint proposal, in which a requirement for a popular initiative was set at only
50 000 signatures.164 None of these drafts provided for an institution of a
direct legislative popular initiative (which could be submitted directly to the
vote of the people). The President's and the Senat's drafts also provided for
an institution of popular veto. In both cases, the launching of a popular vote
aimed at repealing a law would require collecting 500 000 signatures.165 
One Constitution draft was also submitted by the trade union NSZZ
Solidarność. After the amendment in 1994 of the Constitutional Act of April
1992  on  the  procedure  for  the  enactment  of  the  new  Constitution,  the
institution of a constitutional popular initiative was provided for. The trade
union, still politically active, took advantage of this possibility and prepared
their own draft.166 
The  Constitution  was  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly  (a  body
consisting of both parliamentary chambers acting jointly) on 2 April 1997. The
opinions  about  it  varied.  While  some  commentators  claimed  that  this
Constitution  was  a  model  regulation  with  regard  to  the  provisions  on  the
human rights, other found that it "belongs in the garbage".167 
The constitutional referendum based on the Constitutional  Act of 23
April 1992, the first one in the Polish history which concerned the ratification
of a new Constitution, was held on 25 May 1997. Although there was no legal
base  for  such  a  request,  the  parliamentary  opposition  and  the  NSZZ
Solidarność  wanted  the  draft  prepared  by  the  trade  union  and  the
Constitution  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly  to  be  submitted
simultaneously  to  the  popular  vote.168 The  Sejm did  not  agree  with  this
proposition. The citizens' participation in this constitutional referendum was
moderate:  42,86%  of  the  eligible  voters  attended  the  referendum.  The
Constitution was supported by 52,71% of  the voters and 45,89% of them
were against it (the amount of invalid votes amounted to 1,40%).169 
This  referendum also  turned  out  to  be  a  plebiscite  of  the  political
preferences  among  the  citizens.  When  the  results  from  particular
voivodeships  were  compared with  the results  of  the presidential  elections
held in 1995, it became clear that the parts of Poland that voted for Lech
Wałęsa, now voted against the Constitution, and the voivodeships that voted
164 Eugeniusz Zieliński, p. 40.
165 Ibidem.
166 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 23 and Maria Kruk, Prawo
inicjatywy ustawodawczej w nowej Konstytucji  RP, Przegląd Sejmowy, Vol. 2
(25)/1998, p. 17.
167 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 177-178.
168 Stanislaw Gebethner,  Poland,  in:  Andreas Aurer/Michael  Bützer  (ed.),  Direct
Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience, Aldershot 2001, p.
135-136 and Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 179.
169 Marcin Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 179-180.
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in favor of Aleksander Kwasniewski, now supported enactment of the new
Constitution (the Constitution was prepared mostly by the left-wind party,
Democratic Left Alliance).170
The enacted Constitution finally formed a firm and permanent legal
base for the institutions of direct democracy, as it provided for a nation-wide
facultative referendum on important issues, a facultative referendum on the
ratification  of  international  agreements,  a  facultative  referendum  on
amending the Constitution, a legislative popular initiative (of a group of 100
000 people)  and  a  facultative  local  referendum on  issues  concerning  the
community,  including  a  recall.  In  general,  the  constitutional  law  scholars
stated  that  the  scope  of  the  provisions  on  direct  democracy  institutions,
included in the new Constitution, fully guaranteed the rights of the people
and  prevented  a  situation  where  the  Legislature  could  limit  this  right  of
citizens to participate in the decision-making process.171 This statement can,
however, be questioned, as the Constitution provides for a very limited use of
the direct democracy mechanisms at the domestic level. The institutions of
direct democracy were not treated as means allowing citizens to realistically
influence political  choices,  but  they were rather  designed to keep up the
appearances of a modern, democratic system.
4.2.2.1.3 The reform of the direct democracy laws
The limited legal framework of the direct democracy institutions was
neither improved when the law on popular initiative was enacted on 24 June
1999  (thereafter  "the  1999  law"),  nor  when  the  new  law  on  nation-wide
referendum was passed on 14 March 2003 (thereafter "the 2003 law").172 
The former law regulates the first in Polish history legislative popular
initiative  available  to  the  citizens  (as  the  previous  popular  initiative  was
foreseen only for a particular purpose of the enactment of the Constitution). It
is based on and further specifies the Article 118 (2) of the Constitution.173 It
should  be  reminded  that  it  was  not  the  first  time  that  the  institution  of
popular initiative was proposed in the Polish Parliament, as between 1919
and 1921 many constitution drafts also included this instrument. It was of
course not provided for in the Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland
of  1952,  but  it  became more  and more  present  in  the  constitutional  law
literature from the mid-1980s onwards, when the authors began to stress the
need to include it in the Polish legal system.174 
170 Ibidem, p. 180.
171 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 11 citing: M. Jablonski, Wynik
referendum  a  zasada  dyskontynuacji  prac  Sejmu,  Acta  Universitatis
Wratislaviensis, Vol. XLI/1998, p. 115.
172 Dz.U. 2003.57.507.
173 Maria Kruk, p. 9.
174 Piotr Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku, p. 48 citing: A. Szmyt, W sprawie inicjatywy
ustawodawczej, RPEiS, Vol. 2/1986, p. 100.
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Judging by the form that the Deputies have decided to provide for this
instrument,  the popular initiative has been neither designed to enrich the
regular  legislative  process,  nor  to  really  allow  the  citizens  to  effectively
propose legal drafts (as only the popular initiative in a form of a precisely
formulated law draft is foreseen by this law). Furthermore, the Constitutional
provision regulating this institution is formulated in a way that does not place
the popular initiative on equal level with other legislative initiatives.175 The
structure of the popular initiative is of an indirect character.176 People cannot
prepare a draft and, if it fulfills the formal requirements, submit it to a popular
vote. The only option is the possibility to submit it to the Parliament which
considers it during the regular legislative process. There are no legal means,
foreseen in the law, for the citizens to influence the Parliament’s work. What
is more, the Initiative Committee cannot also propose any changes to the
proposed draft  or even withdraw it,  after the draft  is  submitted (as those
rights of the Committee were left to be regulated in the Sejm's and Senat's
statutes, which do not provide directly for such possibilities).177 However, it
has to be noted that some authors are of the opinion, that the representative
of the Initiative Committee has a right to introduce changes to the submitted
draft.178 Although the requirement of the collection of 100 000 signatures is
not at all strict (taking into account the number of Polish citizens), some other
provisions make the initiative ineffective.  For instance, Article 10 (2) of the
law on popular initiative states that after the Initiative Committee is officially
registered, it has only three months to collect the 99 000 signatures (the first
1000 must be collected before the registration as it constitutes one of the
prerequisites of the successful Committee registration, according to Article 6
(1) of the law on popular initiative). This kind of a requirement obliges the
Committee  to  act  extremely  quickly  and  effectively  as  on  average  the
amount of signatures collected per day should exceed 1100. These provisions
take  their  toll  in  practice:  statistics  show,  that  since  the  moment  the
mentioned act  came in force (1999)  until  the end of  2011,  105 Initiative
Committees  have  been  registered,  but  only  38  of  these  Committees
submitted the required amount of signatures.179 
Furthermore, the draft prepared by the citizens has to contain all the
elements of the draft law that are required from the authorities when they
submit the draft. The draft needs to have a justification, it has to analyze in
detail its relation to other laws, and it needs to evaluate the potential costs of
175 Jerzy  Kuciński,  Demokracja  przedstawicielska  i  bezpośrednia  w  Trzeciej
Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2007, p. 285-286.
176 Marcin Rachwał, Demokarcja bezpośrednia, p. 95; Some authors describe this
type  of  a  popular  initiative  also  as  an  "agenda  initiative",  see:  Theo
Schiller/Maija  Setälä,  Citizens’  Initiatives  in  Europe  Procedures  and
Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens, Basingstoke 2012, p. 6-7.
177 Piotr Uziębło,  Ustawa z 1999 roku, p.  50 and 65 and Anna Rytel-Warzocha,
Popular  Initiatives  in  Poland:  Citizens'  Empowerment  or  Keeping  Up
Appearances?, in: Maija Setälä/Theo Schiller (ed.) Citizens' Initiatives, p. 219.
178 Piotr Czerny, Opinia prawna w sprawie interpretacji  art.  14 ust.  2 ustawy o
wykonywaniu  inicjatywy ustawodawczej  przez  obywateli,  Zeszyty  prawnicze
BAS, Vol. 3 (35)/2012, p. 65.
179 https://obywateledecyduja.pl/merytorycznie/stan-obecny/  ,  last  accessed:
12.08.2013,  the  rapport  prepared  by  Obywatele  Decydują  available  at:
https://obywateledecyduja.pl/o-inicjatywie/raport/, last accessed: 16.08.2013.
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introducing this law. Further, an analysis verifying the draft law's conformity
with the European law has to be prepared.180 It is needless to say that the
State  bodies  prepare  the  drafts  with  the  help  of  their  staff  and  experts.
Setting such high standards for  the citizens'  draft  constitutes a barrier  to
submitting popular initiatives. 
Even the positive at first sight provision providing for an exception from
the rule of the discontinuity,181 does not ascertain that the popular law draft
will reach the end of the legislature proceedings. This exception (provided for
by Article 4 (3) of the law on popular initiative) states that after new elections
the Parliament is obliged to continue the works on the people's proposal. As
all  authors  claim,  however,  the  exception  from the  discontinuity  principle
applies only to the works of the newly elected Parliament which gathers right
after  the  dissolution  of  the  Parliament,  during  which  term  the  popular
initiative was filed.182 The Parliament that would be chosen in the elections
after next is no longer obliged to continue the deliberations on the popular
initiative. Therefore, the Polish Parliament is equipped with a practical tool
that can allow it to ignore the people's initiatives. If it does not do so, it is
only on grounds of the instrumental use for political ends. 
The legislative procedure that applies to the draft law proposed by the
popular  initiative  in  general  does  not  differ  from  the  normal  legislative
process. Although Article 13 of the law on popular initiative states that the
first reading of the law draft filed by the people takes place no later than after
three months from the date when the draft was filed or, in case the draft law
is to be considered by the newly-gathered Parliament elected for the term
following  the  term  during  which  the  draft  law  was  submitted  to  the
Parliament, no later than in the six months from the date of the first session
of the Parliament, there is no guarantee that the draft law will reach the end
of the legislative procedure as there are no other provisions that would set
deadlines for the subsequent deliberations of  the Parliament. Therefore, it
may happen that the second reading of the draft law will never take place
due to the prolonged debates in the Sejm's commissions. As data shows, up
to  2011,  ten  popular  initiatives  were  not  considered  further  as  the
commissions could not finish their work before the end of the Parliament's
term, following the term of the Parliament during which the draft law was
submitted.183  
Additionally,  the  citizens'  drafts  face  limitations  with  regard  to  the
subject-matters of the initiatives. They cannot submit draft laws that regulate
areas which are reserved for the sole legislative initiative of the State bodies
180 Piotr Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku, p. 54.
181 According to the discontinuity principle, the Parliament at the end of its term
finishes its work on all of the draft laws, even if their legislative process has
not ended, instead of handing them over to the Parliament elected for the next
term. In Poland this principle is a legal custom, not prescribed by laws. The
exceptions to this rule, however, are stated in the laws.
182 Piotr  Uziębło,  Ustawa  z  1999  roku,  p.  53  and  Jerzy  Kuciński,  Demokracja
przedstawicielska, p. 291.
183 https://obywateledecyduja.pl/merytorycznie/stan-obecny/  ,  last  accessed:
12.08.2013,  https://obywateledecyduja.pl/o-inicjatywie/raport/,  last  accessed:
19.08.2013.
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(eg. the budget). This means that citizens cannot also propose a Constitution
amendment by means of a popular initiative, as submitting a draft amending
the Constitution is a privilege reserved for the State bodies.184 
The 2003 law on the nation-wide referendum repeated many of  the
provisions which had been previously foreseen by the law on referendum of
1995. The facultative referendum on important State matters (provided for by
Article 125 of the Constitution) can still be launched, as the Article 60 of the
2003 law states, following the Sejm resolution (taken by the absolute majority
of votes with a quorum of at least half of the Deputies present) or a decision
of the President with the Senat's consent (given also by the absolute majority
of votes with a quorum of at least half of the Deputies present). As in the law
of 1995, the 2003 law provides that 500 000 citizens can file a motion with
the  Sejm  (which is not binding for the  Sejm), requesting a referendum on
important State matters (Article 63 (1) of the 2003 law; the Constitution of
1997 does not provide for such a motion).  Article 63 (2)  of  the 2003 law
states furthermore, as the Article 6 (1) of the law of 1995 stated, that the
citizens' request for the referendum cannot refer to the matters of State's
expenses, revenues, security and amnesty. 
A  novelty  in  the  Constitution  of  1997  and  the  law  of  2003  is  the
facultative  referendum  on  the  ratification  of  an  international  agreement.
According to Article 90 (2) of the Constitution, the consent to the President's
ratification  of  the  international  agreement  upon  which  some  of  the
competences  of  the  State  bodies  are  delegated  to  an  international
organization or to an international body, has to be given either by the Sejm
with  a  qualified  majority  of  votes  or  by  the  means  of  a  nation-wide
referendum. The decision on the choice of the procedure is reserved to the
Sejm (hence the citizens have no right of the motion in this matter). If the
Sejm decides (by the absolute majority of votes with a quorum of at least half
of  the  Deputies  present)  to  choose  the  referendum  procedure,  the
referendum can be subsequently launched either by the Sejm itself or by the
President with the Senat's consent (the procedure provided in the case of the
referendum on important matters applies). This provision was foreseen by the
Constitution (and subsequently concretized in the law on referendum) for the
purpose of joining the European Union. 
Both of the above-mentioned referendums are binding if at least half of
the eligible voters participates in them. This requirement was also taken from
the law of  1995.  With regard to the results of the vote,  the option which
received the majority of the valid votes is chosen (Article 66 (2) of the 2003
law).  Article  66  (2)  of  the  2003  law  introduces  a  change  in  this  matter,
compared with the Article 9 (2) of the law of 1995, as the latter provision
required  for  a  particular  option  to  be  chosen,  a  majority  of  votes  of  the
participants in the referendum (therefore, as there might be a cases of voters
who participate, but give invalid votes, the previous provision could have led
to a situation where a referendum was binding but brought no result). 
The last type of a referendum provided for by the Constitution of 1997,
and subsequently by the 2003 law on the nation-wide referendum, is  the
facultative  constitution  referendum.  According  to  Article  235  (6)  of  the
184 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Popular Initiatives, p. 214.
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Constitution, this referendum can be launched only if the amendment to a
Constitution foresees changes to the Parts I (the Republic of Poland), II (the
Freedoms,  rights  and  obligations  of  the  humans  and  citizens)  or  XII
(amending the Constitution) of the Constitution. In such circumstances, those
entitled  to  the  right  of  constitutional  initiative  (namely  1/5  of  the  Sejm's
Deputies, the Senat, the President) can file with the Chairman of the Sejm a
binding request for a constitutional referendum, in which the citizens would
ratify  the  proposed  Constitutional  amendment.  The  Constitutional
amendment  becomes  binding  if  a  majority  of  the  voters  supported  the
change. In the case of this referendum, there is no participatory quorum.
It should be noted that analogical requirements for the binding force of
referendums  were  provided  for  by  the  Constitutional  Acts  of  1992  (with
regard to the ordinary referendum, turnout  of  at  least  half  of  the eligible
voters was required and for the constitutional referendum, the majority of the
voters  voting  in  favor  of  the  Constitution  was  required  for  the  new
Constitution to be adopted, with no quorum requirement).185 The current law
on the nation-wide referendum also provided for provisions that made the
participation in referendums easier, such as the possibility to launch a two
day-long referendum (this possibility was used in case of the referendum on
Poland's accession to the European Union on 7-8 June 2003). This law also
regulated extensively the referendum campaign.  
The new law on local referendum was enacted on 15 September 2000
(thereafter "the 2000 law").186 It regulated the direct democracy institutions
on the three State levels (community - gmina, district - powiat, voivodeship -
województwo)  and  retained  the  previous  types  of  the  local  referendums
(referendum on local matters, on self-taxation and recall referendum) and the
citizens' right to file a binding motion for launching a referendum. It should be
stressed that  the Constitution of  1997 and subsequently  the law on local
referendum, with regard to referendums on local issues, do not require the
issues  submitted  to  the  votes  to  be  important  (as  did  the  previous
legislation). The Constitution of 1997 refers only to the issues that concern
the local community (wspólnota samorządowa) and the law of 2000 on local
referendum refers to the local issues that are within tasks and competences
of local authorities. 
According to Article 5 (1)  of  the law on local  referendum, the local
bodies can be recalled only by means of a recall referendum. The referendum
on self -taxation, available only on the level of a community,187 is also an
obligatory one. As of 15 February 2013, Article 54 (2) of the law of 8 March
1990  on  community  government  contains  the  legal  base  for  that188
(previously the requirement that this referendum was an obligatory one was
regulated by Article 7 of the 2000 law on local referendum). With reference to
all types of local referendums, the citizens' motion is binding if it is supported
185 Stanislaw Gebethner, p. 137.
186 Dz.U.2000.88.985.
187 Andrzej  Jackiewicz,  The  Constitutional  and  Statutory  Basis  for  a  Local
Referendum in Poland, in: Jarosław Matwiejuk/Krzysztof Prokop (ed.) Evolution
of  constitutionalism  in  the  selected  states  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,
Białystok 2010, p. 183.
188 Previously this act of law was called "on local government".
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by 1/10 of the citizens in case of the votes on the level of a community or a
district or 1/5 of the citizens in case of the votes on the level of voivodeship.
The time for the collection of the signatures remains set at  60 days.  The
referendum on self-taxation or on the matters falling under the competence
of  local  authorities  can  also  be  launched  upon  a  decision  of  the  local
legislative  body  (respectively  the  community,  district  or  voivodeship
authority, depending on the referendum type). The referendums are valid if
the participation amounts to at least 30% of the eligible voters. The results of
the referendums are binding if at least over a half of the valid votes supports
a particular option. In case of the referendum on self-taxation, at least 2/3 of
the valid votes supporting a particular option is required.
The local referendum on community matters is limited to the issues
that are within the competences of the local authorities. Therefore, matters
that  concern the communities  but  are  to be decided exclusively  by other
authorities  (than  the  local  ones)  cannot  be  subject  to  local  referendums.
Further,  local  referendums  cannot  be  launched  on  organizational  matters
relating to the structure of the local authorities. For instance, citizens cannot
appoint anyone to a post by means of a referendum, if the popular elections
for that post are not provided for. What is more, the local referendum cannot
be used as a popular veto that would allow the citizens to repeal a local legal
act.189
It  should be stressed that the introduction of the recall  referendum,
which exists until today, turned out to be, from the current perspective, the
only moment when the people gained access to a political tool which they
could  use  effectively  upon  their  own  request.  Nevertheless,  this  did  not
represent  a  significant  breakthrough,  as the law on local  referendum was
amended on 8 July 2005 so that henceforth, the participation rate in a recall
referendum was required to be at least 3/5 of the participation rate recorded
when the authority subject to the recall was elected.190 And even before, the
participation rate was not high enough, on average, for those referendums to
be binding.191 The current authorities' suggestion to limit that institution even
more192, only confirms this view.
189 Piotr  Uziębło,  Ustawa  o  referendum lokalnym.  Komentarz,  Kraków  2007,  a
commentary on art. 2 of the act on local referendum (internet version provided
by LEX).
190 Dz.U. 2005.175.1457.
191 http://pkw.gov.pl/wybory-w-trakcie-kadencji/informacja-o-przeprowadzonych-  
referendach-w-sprawie-odwolania-organow-samorzadu-terytorialnego-w-
latach-1992-2006.html, last accessed: 14.08.2013.
192 As described below in the section 4 “Reactive sequence phase approaching?".
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4.2.2.1.4 The  practical  application  of  the  direct
democracy institutions
The  use  of  the  direct  democracy  institutions  can  be  characterized
currently  by a  relatively  high  interest  of  the  citizens  and a  relatively  low
support  from the authorities for  the citizens'  participation in  the decision-
making  process.  The  only  nation-wide  referendum  that  was  launched  in
Poland after the constitutional referendum of 1997 was the referendum on
joining the European Union, more precisely on the consent to the President's
ratification  of  the  international  treaty  on  joining  the  European  Union,
concluded in Athens on 16 April 2003 between the European Union and the
ten candidate states (including Poland). The  Sejm decided first, on 17 April
2003, that the consent to the ratification of this treaty would be given not by
the lower chamber of the Parliament (which was one of the possibilities), but
by  the  citizens  in  a  referendum.  Subsequently,  it  was  decided  that  the
referendum would take place on 8 June 2003. The Sejm also stated that the
vote would be scheduled over two consecutive days – 7 and 8 June.  The
decision  to  prolong  the  voting  over  the  two  days  was  prompted  by  the
authorities fearing a low participation.193 As stated earlier, for this kind of a
referendum to  be  binding,  the  participation  of  over  a  half  of  the  eligible
voters  was  required.  This  choice  has  proven  to  be  a  correct  one,  as  the
participation of the citizens was not overwhelming (although higher than in
previous votes) and amounted to 58,85%. 77,45% of the participants voted in
favor of joining the European Union.194
This very small number of nation-wide referendums that took place in
Poland does not mean that the citizens are not aware of the existence of this
institution.  At  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the  citizens'  initiatives  to  launch  a
referendum were mostly inspired by the political parties, especially by the
Polish People's Party (i.e. a request for a referendum on the administrative
division of the State in 1998 and two requests for a referendum in 2000 – one
on the privatization and one on State forests).195 This tendency seems to be
changing currently. Recently, in March 2012, the request for a referendum
concerning the increase of the retirement age, submitted by the trade union
NSZZ Solidarość together with  2 000 000 signatures did not convince the
Sejm to  launch  the referendum.196 As  numerous  media stated,197 this  was
193 Marcin Rachwał, Demokarcja bezposrednia, p. 183.
194 Ibidem, p. 186.
195 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 22-23.
196 http://niezalezna.pl/42487-wielka-zmiana-konstytucji-sejm-juz-nie-odrzuci-
projektow-obywatelskich,  last  accessed:  06.08.2013,
http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/pl/strona-glowna/referendum-emerytalne-1.html,
last  accessed:  19.08.2013  and  http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Sejm-
odrzucil-wniosek-Solidarnosci-o-przeprowadzenie-referendum-
emerytalnego,wid,14377427,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=111276,  last  accessed:
19.08.2013.
197 http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/edukacja/artykuly/711149,6_latki_do_szkol_refe  
rendum_nie_bedzie_politycy_boja_sie_pytac_obywateli_o_zdanie.html and
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probably  due  to  the  fear  that  the  referendum  result  would  oppose  the
Parliament’s decision to change the retirement age. 
At the time of writing, a group of citizens wants to launch a referendum
on  education.  They  formed  an  Association  Rzecznik  Praw  Rodziców
(Ombudsman for Parents' Rights) and in June 2013 submitted a motion for a
referendum with nearly 950 000 signatures. The association is against the
recent education reform introduced by the Ministry of Education, which would
require the 6 year olds to start their elementary education (currently they
start school at the age of 7).  Apart from this issue, the referendum would
also concern other matters, such as the return to the full course of the history
in high schools (recently, the history course on the level of high schools was
limited) and the liquidation of gymnasiums and the return to the previous
education system which consisted of 8 years of primary school education and
4 years of high school education. The Association claims that the schools are
not logistically prepared for the 6-years-olds to start their education.198 On 13
August 2013, the  Sejm's  Chancellery confirmed that the motion was signed
by the sufficient number of citizens. Now the  Sejm will  have to decide on
launching the referendum.199 
The institution of legislative popular initiative is also well known among
the  citizens.  Between  1999  and  2011,  105  initiative  committees  were
registered,  out  of  which  81  prepared  the  draft  law  according  to  the
requirements  and  only  38  managed  to  collect  the  requested  100  000
signatures.200 Ten of those projects were considered by the Parliament in a
pace  that  led  to  their  discontinuation,  five  were  not  accepted  during  the
legislative procedure (out  of  which,  four were already rejected in the first
parliamentary reading) and eight were enacted by the Parliament, although
not  always  in  the  exact  same form as  formulated  by  the  citizens  in  the
initiative. The remaining were still subject to the legislative procedure at the
end of  2011.201 The above-mentioned association  Rzecznik  Praw Rodziców
also filed one draft  law aiming at amending the educational  reform. Their
proposal was dismissed in the Sejm in June 2012.202
Most  referendums  take  place  on  the  local  level.  While  there  is  no
complete data available on the local referendums on local matters and on
self-taxation  (as  there  is  no  nation-wide  records  of  these  types  of  local
referendums), it can be estimated that they only amount to about 10% of all
referendums  that  are  held  on  the  local  level.203 As  far  as  the  local
http://www.fakt.pl/Zwiazkowcy-chca-ustawy-o-
referendach,artykuly,225249,1.html, both last accessed: 4.09.2013.
198 http://www.oswiata.abc.com.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/zweryfikowano-podpisy-pod-  
wnioskiem-o-referendum-ws-szesciolatkow, last accessed: 19.08.2013.
199 Ibidem.
200 The  rapport  prepared  by  Obywatele  Decydują  available  at:
https://obywateledecyduja.pl/o-inicjatywie/raport/, last accessed: 16.08.2013.
201 The  rapport  prepared  by  Obywatele  Decydują  available  at:
https://obywateledecyduja.pl/o-inicjatywie/raport/, last accessed: 16.08.2013.
202 http://www.oswiata.abc.com.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/zweryfikowano-podpisy-pod-  
wnioskiem-o-referendum-ws-szesciolatkow, last accessed: 19.08.2013.
203 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Demokracja bezpośrednia, p. 18 and 20.
51
C2D Working Paper Series 44 / 2013
referendums on self-taxation are concerned, the available data appears to
demonstrate that the participation in these kinds of referendums is generally
high and amounts often to over 40%.204 
The participation rate in the referendums on local issues is much lower
and  often  results  in  invalid  votes.205 In  relation  to  this  type  of  local
referendum, practical interpretation difficulties arose in relation to the issues
which can be subject to these referendums. These interpretation problems
were especially present until 1997, when the local issue was still meant to be
"important", which was a very vague term. But even afterwards, the Polish
administrative  courts  and  finally  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  faced  the
question  on  the  substantive  scope  of  the  local  referendums.  While  the
judgments of the administrative courts differed,206 the Constitutional Tribunal
stated in 2003207 that the provisions regulating the local referendum should
be  interpreted  in  a  way  that  they  do  not  preclude  the  referendums  on
important issues relating to the social, cultural or economic bonds uniting the
community, which are not exclusively within the competences of other public
authorities.
The  National  Election  Commission  (Państwowa  Komisja  Wyborcza)
collects the data on recall referendums on the local level, therefore in relation
to  this  type  of  local  referendums  the  information  on  its  use  should  be
complete.208 According  to  the  Commission’s  statistics,  599  local  recall
referendums were held between 1992 and 2012, out of which 71 were valid
and binding. This amounted to less than 12% of valid votes. In years 2000
and 2001, there was a significant increase in the use of this institution, as
during this period 178 recall referendums were held (out of which only 21
were valid). This might have been caused by an increased activity of local
communities,  which gained new powers after the administrative reform of
1999.209
As stated at the beginning of this section, the reproduction phase that
followed the critical juncture of 1980 and its subsequent production phase,
can be described as a period when the same institutional pattern keeps being
repeated. Over the years, the laws on direct democracy mechanisms were
204 Jerzy  Kucinski,  Demokracja  przedstawicielska  i  bezpośrednia  w  Trzeciej
Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2007, p. 279. 
205 Jerzy Kucinski, Demokracja przedstawicielska, p. 281.
206 Ibidem, p. 280
207 The Constitutional Tribunal verdict of 26 February 2003, K 30/02.
208 http://pkw.gov.pl/wybory-w-trakcie-kadencji/informacja-o-przeprowadzonych-  
referendach-w-sprawie-odwolania-organow-samorzadu-terytorialnego-w-
latach-1992-2006.html,  http://pkw.gov.pl/kadencja-2010-2014/wybory-i-
referenda-lokalne-w-trakcie-kadencji-organow-jednostek-samorzadu-
terytorialnego-lata-2011-2012.html,  http://pkw.gov.pl/kadencja-2006-
2010/informacja-o-zarzadzonych-i-przeprowadzonych-referendach-w-sprawie-
odwolania-organu-samorzadu-terytorialnego-przed-uplywem-kadencji-
kadencja-rad-2006-2010-.html, last accessed: 19.08.2013.
209 Andrzej K. Piasecki, Twenty years of Polish direct democracy at the local level,
in: Theo Schiller (ed.) Local Direct Democracy in Europe, Wiesbaden 2011, p.
130.
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amended  and  even  replaced  by  new  laws  ones,  but  no  change  or
development of the overall concept of the direct democracy in Poland can be
observed  throughout  this  time.  This  tendency  of  the  reproduction  of  the
institutional  pattern  is  also  reflected  in  the  practical  application  of  these
mechanisms.  The  authorities  keep  denying  the  people  the  right  to  make
important decisions (except for the moments when they would like to share
the responsibility for particular decisions with the population).  On the one
hand,  citizens  continuously  try  to  make  use  of  the  direct  democracy
mechanisms (by submitting popular initiatives or requests for referendums)
but, on the other hand, they often fail to participate in the votes, especially at
the local level.  
4.3 Outcome
The concept of the direct democracy institutions established in 1987,
following the 1980 events, is still present until today in the legal framework of
the referendum and popular initiative. As mentioned earlier, the Communist
regime introduced the institutions of direct democracy into the legal system
in a response to the tensions in the Polish society. The idea was, however, to
give people merely an impression that their voice mattered and that they
could take part in the decision-making process. In fact the institutions allowed
the people's voice to be heard only if the authorities decided to listen to it.
This tendency was also preserved after the fall of Communism, up until now.
In general, it was assumed that the legislature did not "trust" the institutions
of direct democracy.210 The analysis of the law on referendums fully confirms
this thesis. In cases of both, the referendum and the popular initiative, the
Sejm reserved to itself the final decision on continuing the direct democratic
procedure after the motions were filed by the citizens.  
Today, it is noticeable how both the executive and the legislature still
resist sharing power with the people. They do not support the idea of the
Nation directly participating in the decision-making process. The Sejm rejects
every request for the referendum filed by the Deputies and by people, even if
the number of signatures collected significantly exceeds the amount required
by law. 
Further,  the  institution  of  popular  initiative  does not  provide  for  an
efficient tool allowing the people to propose legal drafts. Citizens can submit
a precisely formulated draft law, but they have no further effective possibility
to participate in the legislative process nor to verify or influence the outcome
of  that  process.  The  only  significant  exception  to  the  regular  legislative
process is that the general rule of discontinuity of parliamentary deliberations
does not apply to the proposal made by means of popular initiative. However,
even this exception, as shown above, is not completely effective.
On the local level, the use of referendum, especially the recall one, is
much more popular, due in part to the fact that citizens are empowered to file
210 Andrzej  K.  Piasecki,  Demokracja  bezpośrednia,  p.  11  citing:   M.  Jabloński,
Wynik  referendum  a  zasada  dyskontynuacji  prac  Sejmu,  Acta  Universitatis
Wratislaviensis, Vol. XLI/1998, p. 115.
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a binding motion to launch it. Nevertheless, the participation requirements
render the vast majority of local referendums invalid. The high participation
requirements of the local referendums give undue weight to the people who
chose not to participate in them. Therefore, the outcome of the referendums
depends in fact on these citizens who have no interest in its result.
It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  Polish  authorities  still  treat
referendums as plebiscites, namely as a way to verify public support for their
decisions  and  subsequently  to  benefit  from  that  knowledge  in  the  next
parliamentary elections. Alternatively, they use this institution only to gain
the  popular  legitimization  for  their  actions  (such  as  in  the  case  of  the
constitutional  referendum  or  the  referendum  on  the  accession  to  the
European Union) and to share the responsibility for those choices with the
people.  In  such  cases,  the  authorities  launch  referendums only  when the
result of the vote can be easily foreseen. 
4.4 Phase of reactive sequences approaching?
The process of the reproduction of the institutions of direct democracy,
in which the inefficient legal instruments are being duplicated, seems to be
still  developing.  A question could be therefore posed if  the current  phase
already constitutes the outcome of the 1980 critical juncture with regard to
the institutions of direct democracy, or whether it is rather the beginning of
the next phase, namely reactive sequences. Taking into account the citizens'
growing interest in these instruments, it cannot be excluded that eventually
the  direct  democracy  laws  will  evolve  in  a  way  to  allow  the  people  to
effectively take part in the decision making process. It is therefore possible
that  the  people's  discontent  with  the  way  in  which  their  initiatives  (both
legislative  and  motions  for  referendums)  are  treated  by  the  Sejm will
eventually  initiate  a  phase  of  reactive  sequences  which  could  result  in
changes in the current design of the direct democracy institutions. 
Since  2004,  an  NGO  -  The  Civil  Affairs  Institute  (Instytut  Spraw
Obywatelskich) - actively promotes the broadening of the citizens' rights to
participate in the decision-making process.211 In 2011, a report on the use of
the popular initiative was published, where the faulty provisions affecting the
use  of  this  institution  were  pointed  out.212 The  same  year,  the  Institute
published  also  a  collection  of  ten  proposals  prepared  by  the  Polish
constitutional law experts, aiming at finding legal solutions to improve the
functioning  of  direct  democracy  in  Poland.213 For  instance,  the  Sejm's
competence to refuse launching a referendum requested by the people has
been there criticized.214
211 http://inspro.org.pl/about-us/  , last accessed: 06.08.2013.
212 https://obywateledecyduja.pl/o-inicjatywie/raport/  , last accessed: 06.08.2013.
213 Bogusław Banaszak/Jarosław Zbieranek, Ankieta konstytucyjna, Lódź 2011.
214 http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki7ka.nsf/Projekty/7-020-681-2013/$file/7-020-681-  
2013.pdf,  last  accessed:  06.08.2013  citing:  K.  Skotnicki.  in:  Bogusław
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The  current  opposition,  namely  the  Law and  Justice  Party  (Prawo i
sprawiedliwość) already announced that it wanted to take measures to reform
the direct democracy institutions. On 17 June 2013, the party submitted a
draft law amending the Constitution. The Deputies opted for the introduction
of  a  binding  popular  initiative  to  launch  a  referendum.  According  to  the
proposal  such  an  initiative  would  require  1 000  000  signatures  for  its
validity.215 This way the Sejm could no longer ignore the people's will to state
their opinions by means of a referendum. However, a referendum could not
be launched with reference to matters such as a Constitutional amendment,
State budget, State defense, participation in military operations and amnesty.
The  Deputies  also  proposed  an  amendment  to  the  popular  initiative
provisions, stating that a draft law submitted by the citizens could not be
rejected by the Sejm in the first reading. They also broadened the scope of
the popular initiative: according to their proposal, 1 000 000 citizens could
submit  a  draft  amending  the  Constitution.  These  citizens  would  also  be
entitled to file a binding request to launch a ratification referendum on the
Constitution amendment.216 This proposal definitely takes into consideration
the disadvantages of the legislation currently in force. Still, it could be argued
that the draft contains the requirements that are too strict. For instance, it
leaves it to the Parliament to establish in the legal acts the time within which
the signatures should be collected. If this proposed Constitution amendment
is passed, only the amendments to the laws on the nation-wide referendum
and on the popular initiative will determine if the proposed changes are in
fact a step forward in the evolution of the direct democracy institutions. If, for
instance, the recalled provisions on the time frame within which signatures
must be collected will not guarantee sufficient time for their collection, the
proposed amendment to the Constitution will be meaningless.
The attitudes towards direct democracy institutions vary significantly
between different political actors. For instance, the President has started to
mention more often that the law on local referendum should be amended by
limiting  the  institution  of  the  recall  referendum.  This  is  the  effect  of  the
relatively  frequent  use of  this  type of  vote  by the citizens.  The President
suggested that the recall referendum could only be valid if the participation
rate was equal to the participation recorded when the authority subject to the
recall was elected217 (currently the required  quorum amounts to 3/5 of the
election participants). Such a high participation requirement would make the
recall referendum a meaningless institution. 
Further,  the  behavior  of  the  current  governing  party,  facing a  local
recall referendum aimed at the President of the City of Warsaw (and a vice-
chairman  of  the  Civic  Platform party),  is  highly  undemocratic.  The  Prime
Minister began to encourage the citizens of Warsaw not to go to the popular
Banaszak/Jarosław Zbieranek (ed.), Ankieta konstytucyjna, Lódź 2011, p. 108.
215 http://niezalezna.pl/42487-wielka-zmiana-konstytucji-sejm-juz-nie-odrzuci-  
projektow-obywatelskich, last accessed: 06.08.2013.
216 http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki7ka.nsf/Projekty/7-020-681-2013/$file/7-020-681-  
2013.pdf, last accessed: 06.08.2013.
217 http://metromsn.gazeta.pl/Wydarzenia/1,127307,14098174,Odwolanie_wladz_  
bedzie_niemozliwe__Nowy_projekt_referendow.html,  last  accessed:
06.08.2013.
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vote218 (instead of seeking to enhance the participation and voting in favor of
the  Civic  Platform).  Soon  afterwards,  the  President  of  Poland  joined  this
campaign (despite the fact that he is meant to be politically neutral)  and
announced that he himself would not participate in this referendum.219 
Recently, one of the Deputies of the Civic Platform sent an official letter
to  the  National  Election  Commission  trying  to  argue  that  some  of  the
signatures  collected  in  favor  of  launching  the  referendum  should  be
considered  void  by  the  said  Commission,  as  they  were  collected  during
cultural and sport events.220 The collection of signatures during such events,
according to this Deputy, puts into question the capability of the voters to
make a deliberate decision with regard to signing the referendum's lists. This
Deputy ignores, however, the fact that the Polish referendum law does not
provide for any limits concerning the places where the signatures should be
collected.
Therefore, taking into account the signs of the growing interest of the
citizens in the direct democracy institutions and the hostile attitude of the
authorities  to  the  citizens  engagement,  it  may  be  assumed  that  if  this
tendency prevails, possibly the citizens will eventually manage to enforce on
the authorities changes in laws on direct democracy institutions, for instance
by electing Deputies who understand the people’s eagerness to participate in
the decision-making process. Nonetheless, it will be possible to state so only
from a time perspective. 
5 Conclusions
Due to its tempestuous history, Poland does not have a long tradition
of stable democracy. This can also be said about the legal framework of the
direct  democracy  institutions.  The  method  of  critical  junctures  and  path-
dependence helped illustrating the reasons behind its development. 
While the institutions of direct democracy were proposed in numerous
Constitution drafts, the Polish Sejm did not use the opportunity to introduce
them into the Constitutional system in 1921, as the majority of the Deputies
thought  that  they  could  lead  to  ineffective  decision-making.  Besides,  the
newly-created Polish system after the First  World War was inspired by the
French political system which did not favor direct democracy. The introduction
of direct democracy could not stop the transformation of the parliamentary
system into an authoritarian one at that time. Nevertheless, this could have
played a significant role in forming the citizens' sense of civic responsibility. 
The subsequent Communist regime, which was the final result of the
Second World War, was even more disastrous with regard to the participation
of  the  citizens  in  the  decision-making  process.  This  totalitarian  political
system was based on the idea of suppressing human rights and therefore did
not  promote any kind of  citizens'  initiatives or  power-shearing.  It  caused,
218 http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1030602.html  , last accessed: 09.08.2013.
219 http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Prezydent-nie-wezmie-udzialu-w-  
referendum-w-Warszawie-Politycy-oburzeni,wid,15879793,wiadomosc.html?
ticaid=111185, last accessed: 09.08.2013.
220 http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1037488.html  , last accessed: 09.08.2013.
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however, the ongoing strikes and protests which in the end led the political
leaders to apply a policy of appeasements and to introduce the institutions of
direct democracy in a limited scope. 
The today’s legal framework of direct democracy is still strongly rooted
in the concept applied in 1987, which was influenced by the events of 1980.
The  small  changes  that  were  introduced  over  the  years  (such  as  the
introduction of an indirect legislative popular initiative and of a non-binding
popular  initiative  to  launch  a  referendum),  cannot  be  mistaken  for
progressive developments. The current data on the use of direct democracy
shows  that  the  authorities  still  want  to  keep  to  themselves  the  right  of
launching popular votes and want to benefit from that prerogative when they
need the citizens'  support  (and they can foresee that this support  will  be
given). However, every time when a popular initiative to launch a referendum
is submitted, the authorities do not allow it, probably fearing that the citizens
will disagree with them. Further, when the legislative popular initiatives are
submitted, only very few of them are eventually adopted by the Parliament.
In this context, the statements of the politicians that the citizens are not able
to make a conscious decisions221 or even to consciously sign the petition for
launching a referendum if the signatures are collected during sport or cultural
events are meaningful. 
Naturally, it can also be argued that there is no need to change the
structure  of  the  institutions  of  direct  democracy.  If  the  electorate  is
unsatisfied with the authorities' decisions on launching the referendums or on
not  passing  the  laws  proposed  by  the  people,  it  can  consequently  vote
against these particular Deputies in the next elections. The evaluation of the
current state of the direct democracy in Poland is not unambiguous and may
vary,  depending  on  the  model  of  the  direct  democracy  used  for  the
comparison.  Nevertheless,  it  can be assumed that  the introduction of  the
direct democracy mechanisms with very high requirements for their use can
only lead to  dissatisfaction among the citizens.
Does the presented development of the direct democracy institution
mean that these institutions introduced in 1987 were in fact progressive? To
some extent, this appears to be the case. The critical juncture of August 1980
forced the Communist authorities to make a step in the direction of including
the citizens in the decision-making process and the institutions introduced
were therefore derived from the democratic system. It is noticeable that they
differed from the institutions which were considered to be directly democratic
by the Socialist doctrine (namely: the elections, the participation in various
State-controlled  organizations,  etc.).  Nevertheless,  those  institutions
introduced in 1987 were not meant for the citizens to be equipped with tools
that could at any time allow them to contradict the will of the authorities.
Until today, those mechanisms serve to keep up appearances and to create
an impression that citizens can express their views.
221 Anna Rytel-Warzocha, Popular Initiatives, p. 226.
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